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AN INVESTIGATION of the RISKS of EXPLOSION in the 
OPERATION of FLAME-PROOF MINING APPARATUS.
By G. Hibberd, A.R.T.C.
INTRODUCTION; In May, 1924> the author was awarded the Walter
Duncan Research Scholarship by the Governors of the Royal 
Technical College, Glasgow, and with the approval of the 
Board of Studies of the College decided to investigate 
certain problems connected with the safe working of electri: 
real machinery in mines.
At that time the term "flame-proof" was applied 
somewhat loosely to certain types of machinery intended for 
use underground and many machines considered flame-proof 
were later shown to be unsafe. This was chiefly due to the 
lack of suitable references for the guidance of designers 
and manufacturers of this type of machinery.
The problem of protecting apparatus was attacked by 
many eminent investigators, and in searching for a solution, 
the character of flame and flame movement, the various 
methods of initiating by electrical means an explosion of 
gaseous mixtures and methods of preventing excessive rise 
of pressure in a gaseous explosion in a partially closed 
vessel had to be thoroughly investigated before the real 
problem of adequate protection could be approached.
In this preliminary work the experimenters used 
spherical bronze vessels, e.g., in February 1924, in a paper 
read before the Institution of Mining Engineers, Professor 
Douglas Hay and Mr. Ira O.F. Statham gave an account of 
experiments, carried out in such vessels, and also mentioned 
that they had tested a large number of switch boxes etc., 
intended for use in mines. A short time later the Safety 
in Mines Research Board Paper No. 5 appeared under the joint 
authorship of I.O.F. Statham and R.V. Wheeler. This paper
also gave results of investigations in which spherical bronze 
vessels were used, and in addition put forward certain 
recommendations which they considered necessary so that flame; 
-proof conditions might obtain.
These papers were welcomed and it was recognised 
that a great step had been made towards the solution of the 
problem of safe working of electrical machinery in mines.
It was felt, however, that the results obtained were only 
truly applicable to spherical vessels, and some difficulty 
arose with regard to the application of the recommendations 
to casings such as were already in use in mines. These 
casings had been evolved from long experience of the 
requirements having special regard to economy of space and 
material, and the ability to withstand the rough usage 
associated with mining operations. Naturally they differed 
greatly in material and shape from the spherical vessels 
used by Hay, Statham and Wheeler.
Many manufacturers had independently evolved 
machinery which they claimed to be flame-proof, but even 
after the publication of the above-mentioned papers some 
doubt existed among them with regard to the margin of safety 
of their products. This was clearly seen when Sheffield 
University announced that they were prepared to receive and 
test Flame-Proof Apparatus and issue certificates if the 
apparatus satisfactorily passed the tests to which they were 
submitted. A large number of manufacturers availed them;
;selves of the opportunity and now possess certificates for 
the apparatus which passed the required tests. In the opin;
:ion of many, testing of such apparatus after application 
of recommendations should not be necessary. Testing might 
be resorted to as a precautionary measure but recommendations 
issued should be such that after their application the 
possibility of failure should not exist.
The authorK thereforeK decided]after careful
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perusal of available literature (a bibliography is given in 
an appendix) and after consideration of the results and 
recommendations given by investigators to confine himself 
to a research in which the vessels used would be typical 
examples of modern mining switch-gear casings, and to 
endeavour to present results in such a form that designers 
and others interested would have no difficulty in deciding 
the dimensions of flanges, gaps, etc., for casings which 
had to be flame-proof.
Flanged casings were obtained and experiments 
performed as here described. The results obtained have 
been presented in the form of graphs from which a suitable 
design for the flange of any casing and a suitable depth 
for the flame-proof gap can readily be found.
Abnormal conditions such as the “blowing" of a fuse 
under large overload conditions, the presence of coal dust 
in addition to gas, the effect of increased temperature of 
casings due to working conditions or electrical de'fects 
have all been considered. In addition the possibility of 
passage of flame at the bearings of protected motors has 
been fully dealt with.
80 far as the author is aware these problems have 
not been discussed in any paper published in this country, 
and he is confident that the present work will be a useful 
addition to the list of publications dealing with Flame-Proof 
Apparatus.
1. The work was undertaken because of the necessity of 
presenting results in a manner that could easily be 
understood and applied with confidence to actual mining 
switch-gear casings, etc.
2. This could only be done by experimenting with casings 
such as were found most suitable (with regard to 
design and material) for use in mines.
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3. The problems dealt with are entirely practical and
practical solutions are offered.
4 . The work bears no distinct relationship to other
works which have the same object in view - viz: absolute
safety in operation under all conditions likely to be encoun: 
itered - but forms what should be a useful addition to the 
list of works on the subject of "Flame-Proof Apparatus", 
since it deals with problems about which very little was 
hitherto known.
In Appendix No. i a reprint of a paper by the author - 
published in the 4th Number of The Journal of The Royal 
Technical College - is presented together with a mathematical 
analysis of the drop in temperature produced by the passage 
of hot gases through apertures.
In Appendix No. ii a list is given of the more 
important works perused by the author. The writer is much 
indebted to their authors and freely acknowledges the 
assistance he received by studying their papers. In this 
connection it is desired to pay special tribute to the work of 
Professor W.M. Thornton, D.Sc., D. Eng., whose many excellent 
papers were a constant source of inspiration.
- V  -  
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INVESTIGATION OF THE RISKS OF EXPLOSIONS IN THE 
OPERATION OF FLAME-PROOF MINING APPARATUS.
Electricity by reason of its adaptability is now 
used extensively in coal mines, but its introduction has 
been accompanied by many dangers, chief among which are the 
possibility of ignition of coal dust and inflammable mixtures 
of methane and air (firedamp). A parallel potential source 
of ignition may be said to exist in the flame safety lamp, 
but the protection afforded by gauzes is such that complete 
confidence may be placed in modern types of lamps, and the 
design is such that omission of parts during assembly is 
inexcusable.
Unfortunately absolute reliance, in electrical appara: 
:tus for use underground, is not justified at present, from a 
safety point of view. Many protective devices have been 
introduced, (quite a number displaying the main features of 
the safety lamp) to guard against the possibility of ignition 
of gas and dust, but with all devices, great care in inspection 
maintenance and assembly of parts must be exercised if the 
apparatus to which they are fitted is to remain safe.
Many vague ideas exist regarding the exact nature .and 
function of these devices, consequently, protected apparatus 
may become unsafe through deterioration, neglect or lack of 
knowledge of proper methods of maintenance of these contrivanc: 
:es.
Few of the original problems of protection of apparatus 
remain to be solved, and progress in this direction is such 
that the day is not far distant when it will be possible to 
install Apparatus, safe in every respect, and be assured that it 
will retain its safety features as long as the apparatus is in 
commission.
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The present Research was oonducted under the direction 
of the Professors of Mining and Electrical Engineering in the 
Royal Technical College, Glasgow, and is ohiefly concerned with 
such methods as might be applied to underground eleotrical Apparatus 
in order to afford adequate protection from explosive mixtures of 
gas and air.
Demonstrations were given annually to the Senior 
Engineering Students of the College.
yHEORY OF PROTECTION: Occurrence of Methane:-
The most ootr.mon explosive gae mixture found in coal 
mines consists of methane and air, and is generally referred to 
as "firedamp." Methane is given off naturally as the coal is 
worked. The gae was probably entrapped daring the early stages 
in the formation of coal, but dissociation of coal substance by 
great pressure and high temperatures aoting over long periods of 
time, may partly account for its presence. If the gas were 
allowed to accumulate highly explosive mixtures would in all 
probability be formed so that to keep mixtures within safe limits 
dilution with air is necessary.
The "Coal Mines Act" requires that "a sufficient quantity 
of air shall be constantly oiroulated to dilute and render harmless 
all noxious and inflammable gases" to such an extent that the 
workings, shall be in a fit state for working and passing therein."
Under normal conditions every endeavour is made to main: 
:tain the required standards of ventilation, but abnormal occurrences 
nay allow of accumulation of gas where it is least desired e.g. in 
the vicinity of eleotrioal apparatus. If the ayetem of ventilation 
is interrupted, say, by a fall of material in an airway, or a 
stoppage of the fan; gas will accumulate in dangerous proportions 
in "gassy" sections of the mine. The workings of the mine may 
also be flooded by the sudden liberation of large quantities of gas
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from an "outburst." In addition to the above the presence of 
'‘blowers" of gas necessitate special attention to ventilation if 
the formation of explosive mixtures of gas and air is to be 
prevented.
PRESENCE OF GA3 IN APPARATUS
Electrical apparatus is subjected to variation of 
temperature daring and subsequent to working periods. Expansion 
and contraction of the metal casings and gaaeous contents will 
accompany each rise and fall in temperature. It follows therefore 
that in the process of cooling after working periods, gas will be 
"drawn" into the box or casing, through the joints, to maintain 
equilibrium of pressure with the outside. If the surrounding 
atmosphere contains methane, a highly inflammable mixture may thus 
be introduced into the casing and thereby create the required 
conditions for an explosion. Openings in the casing may permit 
of natural diffusion of gases, so that independent of temperature 
variations gas may accumulate in electrical apparatus. If the 
above conditions exist all that is necessary to initiate an internal 
explosion is a spark or electrical arc, and in event of flames 
being communicated to the outside of the apparatus, an explosion 
having far reaching and serious effects may be the final result.
Gas tight apparatus or hermetically sealed casings would seem to 
be the remedy, since accumulation of gases inside casings would 
be prevented, but difficulty of inspection, renewal and repair, 
together with rough usage, and deterioration of sealing material 
in the humid atmospheres of mines, render the application of this 
measure impracticable. In the absence of sealing methods we 
cannot prevent the accumulation of gas in casings, 30 that the 
danger of Ignition is ever present. The real danger lies in the 
transmission of high temperature gases and flames to the outside, 
and all protective methods aim at the prevention of this.
IGNITION OF FI REDAM0:-*
The mixtures of C.H.j, (Methane) and air which on burn:
:ing evolve the greatest amount of heat contain approximately 
9.5 per cent of methane, and are highly explosive. In these 
mixtures the methane and oxygen are present in approximately the 
proportiondnecessary for complete chemical combination. If the 
percentage of methane be reduced below 9*5 Per oent les3 heat will 
be generated by the burning mixtures since obviously the amount 
of heat wili depend on the amount of inflammable gas present. In 
mixtures containing over 9 . 5  per cent of methane, there is inauffic 
Vient oxygen present to effect complete combustion. If the per: 
:centage of methane be continuously reduced, a point is reached at 
which only sufficient heat 13 generated by the burning portion to 
raise an adjacent portion to the ignition temperature. With 
further reduotion flame propagation does not take place. A similar 
state of affairs is reached by increasing the percentage of methane 
above 9*5 par cent. The points at which self propagation of flame 
ceases are termecfthe "limits of inflammability" and are 5 .3 per 
cent and 1 4 . 8 per cent respectively. It is evident that any 
variation in the condition of experiment which alters the amount 
of heat transferred from the burning portion to an adjacent portion 
will alter the limits of inflammability. Factors which affect the 
limits are:- material and dimensions of containing vessel, initial 
temperature and pressure of the mixture, and state of mixture i.e. 
whether turbulent or quiescent.
Wheeler has shown that the most explosive mixtures are 
■not the most readily ignitable mixtures, and also that slow burning 
mixtures will transmit flame through small passages when more 
rapidly burning mixtures would not.
Firedamp has a peculiar property by virtue of which a 
source of ignition must be in contact with an Inflammable mixture 
for a definite period of time before ignition takes place, e.g. if 
the temperature of the source be 6p0oC. 10 seoonds elapse between 
the introduction of the source and ignition of mixture; if the
souroe is at a temperature of 1000°C ignition oocura in le89 
than one second. The time i3 not oooupled in bringing the mixture 
to the temperature of the source (this is probably effected in 
a email fraction of a second) but way be due to the rate at which 
chemical combination takes plaoe. The rate of combination is quite 
measurable at 30Q°C and inoreases rapidly with temperature. This 
combination results in liberation of heat which raises the temper: 
:ature of the surrounding mixture. Thus the rate of combination 
increases rapidly until finally the temperature is such that 
combination takes place throughout the mixture almost instantaneous: 
:ly. It follows therefore that the higher the temperature oi the 
source the shorter will be the period necessary to raise the 
temperature of the gas to that at whioh instantaneous combination 
is effected throughout the mixture. Thi3 is important from a 
mining point of view, since if flame or hot gases from an explosion 
in a caaing, can be oooled considerably before reaching the outside, 
the chances of external ignition will be slight. The flames from 
an explosion are of ahort duration, and if considerably cooled, 
would not be in contact with the external mixture for the period of 
time necessary to initiate explosion at the temperature of the 
"oooled" gases.
P08SIBLE SOURCES OF IGNITION:-
It has been shown that any sustained flame, however small, 
will oause ignition of firedamp mixtures. The arc produced at a 
switch or controller when a oirouit is opened, ie of 3hort duration 
but the temperature is very high and is quite oapable of causing 
Ignition of gas mixtures. Gas surrounding a fuse will be ignited 
if the fuee is "blown." Sparking at commutators of D.0. motors or 
slip rings of A. C. motors must be regarded as a potential source 
of ignition. Broken ooils in stators and rotors of induction 
motors must also be regarded as dangerous, when gas is present.
TRANSMISSION OF FLAMES FROM APPARATUS TO THE OUTSIDE:-
Under the conditions described above, if the motor or
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switch gear 13 not protected external explosion with its accompany: 
:ing destructive effects will inevitably result. If the apparatus 
is inadequately protected the possibility of external ignition is very 
great. If the casings are protected but constructed of material 
not sufficiently strong to withstand the force of the explosion, 
the conditions are equivalent to no protection. It is therefore 
apparent that in addition to preventing passage of flame a casing 
must be able to withstand the pressure developed by an# explosion.
GAS EXPLOSIOSS IN CLOSED VESSELS:-
When an explosive mixture of methane and air is present 
in a metal casing and a source of ignition is applied(say an 
electric spark), flame spreads rapidly from the point of ignition 
throughout the mixture at a rate depending on the amount of methane
^ present. Actual measurement of the temperature of explosion have
* j
recorded 1900°C - 2100°C &e the highest temperature attained.
< Theoretically, the temperature should be considerably higher, but 
the proximity of the cold walls of the containing vessel and 
probable dissociation of methane at high temperatures, eaoh 
absorbing heat, probably together account for difference between 
the theoretical and reoorded temperatures. Since excessive 
temperature development is prevented, pressure development is 
restrained in a like manner.
The maximum pressure reoorded for methane-air explosions 
in completely closed vessels, ie 108 lbs per sq. inch. If the 
joints of the vessel be separated by a small amount the pressure 
la reduoed considerably, since part of the mixture is expelled 
unburnt through the space at the joints, when ignition takes 
place. Hot gases produced by an explosion will also escape if a 
gap is left at the joints of the casing.
METHODS OF PROTECTION ADOPTED:-
From the foregoing it will be evident that the provision 
of a large cooling surface is essential, and in methods of 
protection adopted, this aspect has been kept in view. In a few
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type3 of devices, cooling of flame has apparently bsen the 
prinoipal object aimed at, and the possibility of obtaining 
considerable reduction of pressure while effectively oooling the 
flame has not received the attention it merits. Methods of 
proteotion of apparatus have so far proceeded mainly along four 
lines. One of the earliest methods made use of gauze and perforated 
plates as protective devices. These devices are founded on sound 
physical principles and Involve the provision of large oooling 
surfaces oontiating of wire gauze. The gauzes were separated by 
distance pieoes, but numerous layers were neoessary before the 
deaired effect was achieved. In early applications gauzes were 
used for oooling purposes only; the attainment of considerable 
reduction of pressure seams to have been lost sight of, with the 
result that one of the necessary requirements of adequate protection 
was not obtained. In addition coal dust was free to enter the 
apparatus and aleo lodged on the gauzes and in the interstices, 
interrupting ventilation. The gauzes would be readily corroded, so 
that frequent inapeotion and renewal would probably be necessary. 
Recent research has shown that if properly applied, and entry of 
ooal dust prevented by layers of tin or lead foil, satisfactory 
results may be obtained and considerable lowering of pressure be 
produced in event of explosion.
Labyrinth and plate proteotion was also tried. The 
device consisted of large numbers of thin metal plates so arranged 
and spaced that esoaping gases and flames had to traverse long 
tortuoaes passages before reaching the outside atmosphere. In 
passing through the labyrinth, effective oooling was obtained 
but such was the resistance offered to the escaping gases that 
only slight reduction of pressure resulted. This appliance requires 
accurate machining and fitting, and is easily damaged. Coal dust 
will lodge between the plates and reduoe the efficiency of the 
device. This device has not been extensively applied for the 
above reasons.
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Other contrivances adopted are known as relief valves. 
They oonsist of valves, normally held closed by springs, set to 
open a specified distance Immediately the pressure rises above a 
certain amount. In passing through the valves the hot gases are 
brought into contact with large oooling surfaces. These devices 
are also most effective flame coolers, but fail to oause appreciable 
reduction of pressure.
Special devices have special disadvantages, but die:
I advantages common to all of them may be enumerated as follows.
1 . The addition of devices to any apparatus means additional 
care in inspection and maintenance of apparatus, which
of oourse Increases cost of upkeep.
2. Machining of parts and application to oaaings tends to 
increasing price of product.
3 . Special devices require expert handling, and ignorance 
or carelessness in handling may render the device 
useless and the apparatus unsafe.
4 . Accumulation of dirt, grease, ruat, etc., may hinder the 
proper functioning of the device.
5 . Concentration of escaping gases at small area is not 
desirable.
6 . Doubtful whether flame-cooling and pressure reduction 
oan each be carried to safe limits in the 3ame device.
FLASGE PROTECTION:-
This ia perhaps the simplest and most effective method 
of oooling gases and lowering pressure of explosion.
It consists of providing broad flanges at all joints in 
casings, the flanges being so proportioned that the required degree 
of cooling is obtained, and by having a gap of predetermined depth 
between the flanges, excessive pressure development is prevented.
The great advantages of flanges are simplicity^, low cost and perman: 
tence. There ia nothing that can go out of order, and maintenance
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and renewal coats are nil. The U. 3. Bureau of Mines advocate 
metal to metal contact of not less than one inoh at all joints. 
This of course means high pressure in event of an explosion,, and 
necessitates very strong and rugged casings. No advantage is 
taken of the property called "lag on ignition." All that ia 
required is cooling of flame to 700°C or thereby, and as already 
pointed out the lag on ignition at this temperature is such that 
external ignition cannot taka place since the temperature is not 
maintained for a sufficient length of time.
greatest possibilities for adequate protection of electrical 
apparatus for use underground, it was chosen for this particular 
investigation, and all casings used in the experiments were fitted 
with broad flanges.
FLAME PROOF ENCLOSURE:-
the following definition of a flame-proof enclosure:- "A flame 
proof enclosure is one that will withstand without injury any 
explosion that may oocur within it under conditions of the rating 
of the apparatus (and recognised overloads, if any associated 
therewith) and will prevent the transmission of flames euoh as will 
ignite any inflammable mixture which may be present in the surround: 
ting atmosphere."
THE FLAME-PROOF TEST:-
whether they satisfy the requirements of the above definition:- 
The apparatus to be tested ia placed in an "Explosion Chamber" and 
an explosive gas mixture is introduced into it. The Explosion 
Chamber is now closed and filled with an explosive gas mixture, after 
which the mixture in the oasing is ignited and the result noted, if 
the external mixture (i.e. the mixture in the ohamber surrounding 
the apparatus) ia ignited, flame has passed from the apparatus, and
Since flange protection in our opinion offera the
The "British Engineering Standards Association" give
The following test is applied, to casings to determine
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under the conditions of the test, it is unsafe. If no external 
Ignition ooours, the mixture ia ignited by some means, to prove 
its explosibility. The tests are repeated until a consecutive 
number of similar result^are obtained, and according to results 
the apparatus is declared safe or unsafe under the conditions 
of the test.
THE EXPLOSION CHAMBER:-
consisted of a wooden box, fitted with terminals and a gas tap, 
and of the following dimensions:- Length 2 ft. 10 ina. Width 2 ft.
7 inches. Height 2ft. 6 Ins. To prevent damagerin event of an 
external ignition, safety valves or windows were fitted into the 
ends of the box. These windows were 1^ ins square and during the 
filling stage were blocked with paper to prevent leakage. When 
external Ignition ooourred the paper windows were burst, allowing 
of dissipation of energy without damage to the box. If external 
ignition did not occur a light on the end of a 3tiok was thrust 
through the paper to ignite the mixture and prove its explosibility.
METHOD OF OBTAINING EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES:-
and air In known proportions. Objection to this might be made on 
the ground that coal gas ia not found in mines, and that firedamp, 
the explosive mixture generally found in mines, 3hould have been 
used instead. It may be pointed out however that the surrounding 
gas mixture is really only an indicator the purpose of which is to 
Indicate when flame has pasned from the internal explosion. Evident: 
:ly then a mixture of coal-gas and air will serve the purpose 
admirably and such a mixture has the additional advantage that it 
more sensitive to ignition than methane and air (firedamp). Consid; 
:ered in this light results obtained, U3ing ooal gas and air, 
will not vary greatly from those obtained using methane and air
The "Explosion Chamber" used in the investigation
The explosive mixtures were obtained by mixing coal-gas
and any difference will be In favour of coal gas since a 
m*?gin of aafety^lill be obtained. |
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METHOD OF IGNITING THE EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES:-
The gag mixtures in the casing under test were ignited 
electrically by "blowing" a fuse, power being taken from a 2^0 
volt. D.O. supply with a variable resistance in circuit. The 
fuse wire was Ho. 24 S.tf.G. Tin and from 1\ to 2 ins.in length.
APPARATUS TESTED IN THE EXPERIMENTS:-
Each piece of apparatus tested in the experiments was 
fitted with fixed flanges at the joints of cover and casing. The 
casings were typical examples of modern mining switoh-gear casing3. 
These casings were readily adapted for experimental purposes, by 
tapping the sides or ends to receive a gas tap and a lead-in plug 
for the conductors. This adaptation did not in any way interfere 
with the protective features of the boxes. The use of typical . 
switch gear casings is a step which commands Itself, in that any 
weakness or defect in the casings could be readily detected and 
suggestions made for general improvement.
EXPERIMENTAL: JUNCTION BOX WITH GROOVED FLANGES;-
The first set of experiments was carried out on a 
junction box, detached from a gate-end circuit breaker. This 
box had a grooved flange O.p ins broad, into vrhloh fitted a ootton 
gasket, so that when the cover was bolted into position a very 
tight joint was secured. The enda of the box were blocked with 
pieces of wood, bored to receive terminals and a gas pipe. Leads 
were taken from the terminals inside the explosion chamber to those 
on the junction box, and short leads from the latter were bridged 
with a piece of fuse wire, ineide the junotion box. These 
connections having been made, the cover was bolted into position, 
an explosive gas mixture was introduced, and the ga* pipe plugged 
to prevent leakage. The "windows" of the explosion chamber were 
now blocked with paper and the junction box auflfcunded with an 
explosive atmosphere. By closing the switch the fuse was "blown", 
igniting the gas in the junction box, the iffect produced being
r  N •-
noted, a large number of tests as above ®*de with-the gasket
-  1 2  -
in position and then with it removed. Tyoioal results are shown 
in the following table.
TABLE 1 .
Teats Made on Junction Box with Grooved Flanges 0.5 lna. 
Broad. Volume of Box.
0-0 8 •'•Jte 'A-














.020. 3 -4 0 0. 2 0 0 . 3 Yes. No. Tape in 
position in 
Groove.
U 0 0 n n n n
11 I H n ii i i
u a 0 u n t» Signs of 
Charring.
ti n I it YSa. Tape removed 
from Groove.
o n R it 11 II ii
n n n n n n n
' B 0 i* 0 » n t ji
CONCLUSIONS:-
It was found that v/ith the gasket in position flame did 
not pass between the flanges, but after a few ignitions distinct 
signs of charring were seen, showing that if the experiments were 
oontinued the gasket might possibly be burned out, and thereby 
provide a passage for flame to the outside mixta#*. With the gasket 
removed external ignition took piaoe in everf^tfxperiment, indicating 
that a flange 0.5" broad Is not In itself--*® adequate protective 
devioe. tape or gasket is mechanically wea* and would soon rot
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in the humid atmosphere of mines, ana for this reason alone could
soaroely be recommended.
If for any reason the gasket had to be removed great 
care would have to be exorcised in replacing it oorreotly in 
position in the groove, to prevent risk of providing passage for 
flame. Above ground with abundant light this would require ordinary 
oare only, but underground where lighting arrangements are often 
far from perfect it would be a more dlffioult matter.
It would be better to avoid the dangers which might 
arise, by removing the gasket altogether and increasing the breadth 
of flange to one inch or more if necessary. If this measure were 
adopted, we would have a piece of apparatus made flame proof at 
the beginning and always retaining its properties, unlikqfa, device 
depending for its flame proof properties on a material which 
readily deteriorates and hence gradually loses its properties.
EXPERIMENTAL?- PRELIMINARY:-
GATE END CIRCUIT - BREAKER WITH ROUGH MACHINED FLANGES:-
be. sJ„  I'c
The next piece of apparatus,\was a gate-enl box fitted 
with circuit breakers sat to trip at 17*3 amperes. Part of the 
gear was removed to adapt the box for experimental purposes. As 
shewn in the p K o f t h e  oover la hinged and held in position 
by means of eight finch, diameter bolts. The flanges were lfinches 
broad and rough machined. The junction box used in the above 
experiments was re-attached to the gate-end box and tests similar 
to those already described were oarried out.
After one or two tests in which external ignition did 
not occur, it was thought that the combined junction box and gate 
end box was quite safe under the conditions of the test. To 
confirm this,one more experiment under exactly the same conditions 
as the others was made. A violent external explofion resulted when 
the switch was dosed, and on removing the jdhfition box cover the 
cotton gasket was found to be completely bawned through in parts, 
and badly oharred in others. The flame proof properties of the
i
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combined apparatus were thus entirely destroyed. The junction box 
was removed and a piece of wood, bored to reoeive a gas pipe was 
bolted into position in its place.
A number of experiments were now oarried out with the 
flanges of the oover and box in contact, the only gaps being 
those formed by the rough maohining, the largest of which did not 
exoeed .01 inches. Under these conditions it was not found possible 
to initiate an external explosion. By placing pieces of metal 
between the flanges it was possible to obtain gaps of any desired 
depth all round the perimeter oi' the cover. Experiments were thus 
oarried out at various depths of gap until external ignition was 
produced by flame passing between the flanges from an internal 
ignition. The following table shows the average results of a 
large number of experiments.
TABLE
Tests on Gate End Circuit Breaker. Box. Flanges If ins.
Broad. Volume 1.55 Cub, ft.
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In the last experiment of thie series the Explosion 
Chamber was shattered. Apparently the "safety valve" paper 
windows did not operate rapidly enough to prevent damage to the 
box. A gap of 0.053 inches all round the Gate End Box would 
provide a large release area, and at that particular depth of 
gap the flanges could not have a great cooling effeot on the 
flame from the internal explosion. When the internal ignition 
occurred a large mass of intensely hot flame would be projected 
into the external mixture from all round the box. The pressure 
wave preceding the flame would create considerable meohanioal 
disturbance in the external mixture and followed Immediately 
A  by a large body of flame, ignition would take place under conditionsI
approaching detonation. Under these abnormal conditions the 
pressure rise would be so rapid that maximum pressure would be 
attained before relief was obtained by rupturing of the paper 
safety valves. The energy of the explosion would therefore be 
expended on the sides of the explosion chamber Instead of being 
dissipated through the "safety valves." The result was of course 
destruction of the explosion chamber sinoe it was not designed to 
withstand suoh pressures.
POOLING EFFECT OF FLANGES ON FLAME:-
To obtain some information on the flame that causes 
Ignition of the external mixtures, the following experiments 
were performed with the gate-end box in the "open", i.e. surrounded 
by air. An explosive mixture was admitted to "box" in the usual 
manner and ignited, the dietanoe the flame extended beyond the 
flanges being noted approximately* These tests were performed 
with the same depths of gap as were used when the box was in the 
explosion chamber. With the exception of the first series, i.e. 
with flanges in contact with eaoh other, flame was observed in 
every oase, often blue in colour and extending enly & short distance 
beyond the flanges. This was chiefly notloeable with gaps bp to 
0.025 inches in depth. In these oases ceollng had been oarried
- 16 -
out to a successful degree, and In some of the experiments in 
which weak mixtures were used the flame seemed to emerge at a 
relatively alow rate, and never exoeeded one inch in length. At
gaps greater than 0 .0 2 5  inch the flame was brownish-red in 
colour and extended 3 -4  inches. At gaps at which external 
ignition was known to occur bright red flames streaked with 
white, extended more than six lnohea beyond the flanges, when 
ignition took place. The flame was visible all round the casing.
IGNITION OF GAS MIXTURES AT "MAKING"and "BREAKING" CONTACT in the
> END BOX*-
The gear removed from the box was now replaoed and a 
number of experiments oarried out to determine whether an explosion 
of gas could be Initiated at "making" or breaking contact. A
piece of strong twine was attached to the handle of the gate-end
switoh(which was In the OFF position), an explosive mixture was 
admitted to the box, then after dosing the other switches, contact
was made in the gate-end box by pulling the cord. The cirouit-
breakere were set to trip at 17 . 3 amperes, but as there were only 
9 ohms, resistance in the circuit the short circuit current would 
be 2 7 .8 amperes. It follows therefore that no sooner was contact 
made than it was broken by the oirouit breakers operating. The 
flash thus produced ignited the gas mixtures in the casing. Extra 
resistance was Introduced and the current lowered to lp amperes. 
With this reduoed ourrent ignition occurred in eaoh experiment at 
"break", but on one oco&slon ignition took place at "make". This 
was probably due to dirtfbontaots, because when they were cleaned 
no further ignitions occurred at "make."
,. CONCLUSIONS^-*
represented as two separate chambers with a short inter-oommunlcat:
"7M J
The combined gate-end box and Junction box may be
releases pauses Ignition of a gas mix
ting passage* It has been shown that >gi*ption of the overload




chamber would be compressed before ignition 30 that higher 
pressures would be developed. Thi3 probably accounts for the 
sudden rupturung and burning of the cotton gasket. With a piece 
of wood covering the opening over which the junction box ia 
normally attached, the gate-end box 13 flame proof with gaps up 
to O.O38 in3. in depth between the flanges all round the perimeter. 
With the studs in position and the cover secured, there is little 
danger of an external explosion if the opening referred to above 
is well ooversd. In passing, it might be well to mention that the 
stud hole at the hinge communicates with the inside of the casings 
(the others do not). It therefore follows that if this stud is 
omitted the cooling properties of the flanges are of no avail 
because we have a direot passage from the inside of the box to the 
outside atmosphere. This could be prevented by bottoming the 
stud hole, i.e. by covering the bottom of hole with metal aa 
shown in the fig. 5 * I* this alteration were made the value of 
the box from a flame-proof point of view would be considerably 
increased. The failure of the combined apparatus by the burning 
of the gasket is a good illustration of how adequate protection 
of a piece of apparatus (such as by broad flanges of gate-end box) 
may be rendered useless by an Inadequately protected piece of 
apparatus (junction box with narrow flange and gasket) which is 
oonneeted to it. The remedy is protection to the same degree of 
safety for all parts of same apparatus, always remembering that 
adequate protection implies sufficient strength to withstand the 
explosion and ability to oool the gases from the explosion.
CRITICAL LENGTH OF OPENING:-
In this series of experiments an effort was made to 
determine the maximum length of opening for any particular depth 
of gap between flanges of given breadth, which prevents passage of 
flame capable of igniting an explosive mixture of gases. The 
apparatus used oonsisted of two switoh boxes of different volumes 
and fitted with flanges of different breadths. The volume of the 
-smaller bfcx was approximately 0 .1 2 0 ouUT ft. that of the larger
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2 .5 5 2 oub. ft., while the former was fitted with flanges 1 inch 
broad and the latter with flanges li Inch broad. The flanges 
were smooth maohlned.
The smaller box was U3ed in the first part of the 
Investigation. Loose sheet metal flanges (0.010 Inch thick) of 
shape shown in fig. 5 . were prepared and placed between the 
flanges of the cover and the box, so that when the nuts were 
tightened, the only passage from the inside of the box to the 
outside atmosphere was through a small rectangular opening. The 
length of the gap could be fixed and the depth altered by adding 
or removing loose flanges. Fig 2. show3 this clearly.
The initial depth of gap was 0.1 inch, and it was 
found that before flame passed at a temperature sufficiently high 
to ignite an explosive mixture the gap had to be |"inoh long.
Experiments such as above were carried out with gaps
of 0.08 inch, 0 .0 6  inch, 0 .0 4 2 inoh etc., until 0 .0 5 0 inch was
reached when it was found that this depth of gap oould be left all 
round the box and external ignition oould not be produced by the 
flame from an internal explosion.
Teats similar to those described above were carried out 
on the larger box special loose flanges being prepared for the 
purpose.
The gate-end box already desoribed was now adapted 30
that experiments similar to those above might be made on it. By
so doing a better comparison was obtained and the effect of breadth 
of flange and volume better understood.
The results from this series of experiments are shown 
numbered and tabulated at the end of the thesis, while in table 
III selected results are given to demonstrate the manner in which 
the oritioal length varies with depth of gap and breadth of flange.
CQBCLOSIOKS AMD DEDUCTIONS
This eeriee of experiments was most interesting 
especially when nearing what might be termed the "critical length
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of gap, Just prevents passage of igniting flame. A small altera: 
rtion of length of opening at this point decides whether external 
ignition will occur or not. We pass from a stage where there is 
quite definitely internal ignition only, to a stage where there is 
definite external ignition occurring apparently simultaneously with 
internal ignition, so short is the interval between them. Between 
these 3tages we have what might be termed a "retarded ignition" 
stage in which the "lag on ignition" effect is often observed. In 
this stage two distinct reports are heard, first the internal 
explosion followed by the external axploaion. The area of opening 
has been slightly increased but oooling i3 still being carried to 
a considerable degree but not sufficient to lower the temperature 
of the gases below the ignition temperature of the surrounding 
mixture. In other word® the "lag" at the degree of oooling is 
not of sufficient duratibn to prevent external ignition.
It Is inconceivable that, at the short lengths of 
opening cooling is produced solely by oontact with the flanges 
since only a small area is exposed to the flames and the time of 
contact is of short duration. The rapid expansion of the hot 
gases from the explosion through a small opening, will result in 
considerable cooling, and at these small lengths of opening must 
be regarded as the predominant factor in preventing Ignition of 
the external mixture. At the oritioal lengths oooling is carried 
Just sufficiently far to prevent ignition of the outside mixture, 
consequantly any slight alteration of length will affeot the 
degree of cooling. An increase in length increases the area 
through which expansion takes place. It follows therefore that 
expansion to atmospheric pressure will take place at a relatively 
leas rate sinoe the velocity of the issuing gases will be reduced 
as the area of opening is increased. The slower rate of expansion 
will maintain the temperature of the gases for & relatively longer 
period, so that they will issue at temperatures at which the "lag"
W  D N I  I V ^ J Q  JONtffnO HJ_ N I d V
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is negligible and ignition of the external mixture will reault.
In the "retarded ignition" stage the temperature is maintained just 
sufficiently long to allow of ignition of the external mixture at 
the particular temperature, and the distinct pause between the 
two explosions indicates the effeot of "lag on ignition."
As the gap is reduced in depth and increased in length , 
a greater area of flange is exposed, so that at the smaller 
depths of gap cooling by contact with flanges will predominate .
When we reach a depth of gap which can be safely left all round 
the casing, cooling of the gases from the internal explosion will 
be ohlefly accomplished by the flanges and cooling by expansion 
will be negligible.
CURVES:-
From the tabulated results three curves were plotted
with abscissae "Critical Length of Opening", and ordinates
%
"Depth of Gap". (Fig. 6 .) The curves are hyperboldC with the XY 
ordinate as aeymptotea. From log. curves equations .vere obtained 
for each curve and by extrapolation the curves were extended beyond 
the points obtained in the experiments.
If we regard the perimeter of each box as a critical 
length, and, using the equations which satisfy the curves, calculate 
the depths of gaps whioh should prevent passage of flame at the 
partioular perimeter, we find in each case that the calculated 
depth is much less than that found by experiment. The reason for 
this difference may be explained as follows. When a gap is left 
all round a box we have what might be termed an unrestricted 
passage to the outside. Under these conditlona, vghen ignition 
occurs, the rapid expansion of gas at the source of ignition will 
expel unburned gas near the opening. This expulsion of unburned 
gas will oocur at all lengths of opening, and when the length of 
opening la the perimeter of the box the loss must be considerable, 
since gas will escape in all directions. The heat generated depends 
on the amount of combustible gas present, so it naturally follows 
that under the conditions described the heat given off from the
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burning mixture will be very muoh less than the potential heat 
of the original mixture, and the amount of heat to be dissipated 
will be considerably less than when the oaslng is completely 
olo3ed or only partly open.
The large surface provided by the flanges will readily 
oool the escaping gases anu it will be possible to increase the 
depth of gap up to a point beyond the calculated depth, and still 
prevent passage of flame capable of causing ignition of the 
external mixture. Increased depth of gap will increase the, 
area of opening and tend to increase the loss of gas at ignition, 
but a "depth” will be reached when only the gas in oontaot with 
the flanges will be greatly cooled, and the temperature of the 
gas in the centre of the passage will not be appreciably lowered.
In other words the flanges will be so far separated that self 
propagation of flame in the gas mixture between them will be 
possible. It follows therefore that when this point is reached 
external ignition will result. The'depth'found by experiment 
therefore probably represents the maximum 'depth* to prevent 
self-propagation of flame between the flanges, and for the reasons 
stated above will be greater than the oalculated value, when the 
^jperimeter is regarded as the critical length.
The maximum ‘perimeter gap' (i.e. maximum gap that can 
be safely left all round the casing) for each box is indicated 
by a straight line parallel to the X-axis and intersecting the 
curve. It does not follow that these are the safe gaps for these 
flanges for all volumes and perimetersj e.g. taking the smallest 
vessel - volume .1 2 3 oub. ft. breadth of flange 1 inch perimeter 
29 inches, safe perimeter gap .0 3 0 inch. - we cannot say, that 
this depth of gap is safe for any casing fitted with 1 inch flanges. 
Casings of larger volume than .123 oub. ft. will invariably have 
openings with perimeters, greater than 29 inohea, since they will 
house larger gear. Greater volume means greater potential heat 
for same strength of gas mixture so more heat will have to be 
dissipated, and if breadth of flange is to remain at 1 lnoh the 
safe perimeter gap may have to be less than .030 inch. The curves













































































































show that Increase of perimeter (where perimeter is regarded as 
a critical length) necessitate a decrease in depth of gap for same 
breadth of flange and volume, consequently if both volume and 
perimeter increase while the breadth of flange remains the same, a 
further reduotion in depth of gap will be necessary.
Ths alternative to reduction of depth of gap is an 
increase in breadth of flanges, and is indeed the more satisfactory 
method of retaining flama-proofness. The increase in size and 
weight of casings will, in general, necessitate an increase in 
breadth of flanges at joints for reasons other than preventing 
passage of flame, e.g. increase in size of holes for studa, or 
bolts, to retain covers in position etc. However for casings to 
. be used in mines the flame-proof factor is the most important. It
would be interesting and useful if the relationship between volume 
and breadth of flange oould be shown by a curve or expressed by an 
equation.
In fig. 7 a series of curves is shown, abscissae are 
: "Critical Lengths of Opening," and ordinates are "Breadth of
Flange." Readings are taken for same depths of gap from the 
ourves in fig. 6 . The curves indicate that breadth of flange 
has a great elfeot in preventing passage of flame. For example,
V  if we take a gap of 0 .1  inch depth, we find that with flanges 1 
K  inoh broad the critical length is 0.275 inch, while with flanges
• ' *V* I ";
1 ,7 5 inch broad the oritioal length for the same depth of gap is
•Ms
4 *0 inches an increase of 3.625 inohes in oritioal length for an 
inorestse in breadth of flange of 0*75 inohes. In this set of 
curves the effect of volume of oasing has not been considered.
Fig. 8 shows another series of curves in which ordinates 
and abflclfiaae are "Volume of Casing" and Critical Length respective: 
;ly. Readings for equal depths of gap are again taken from fig. 6.
Although no aooount is taken of breadth of flange the 
influence of this factor is clearly seen, since the box with the 







































































































We cannot draw any important conclusions from these 
two seta of curves, since in each, no aocount has been taken of 
factors having an important influence on prevention of passage of 
flam a.
If we consider the volume left for passage of hot 
gases etc., (i.e. the produat of length of gap, depth of gap, and 
breadth of flange) we have here a figure which includes the main 
determining factors in preventing passage of flame. If this were 
plotted against "volume of casing" a satisfactory relationship 
would not be shown, since the curves obtained would be somewhat 
similar to those shown in fig. S. This of course is due to the 
faot that the largest casing used in the experiments was not 
.provided with the broadest flange consequently its "volume of 
passage" was not the greatest for a given length of gap.
If, however we express the "volume of passage" ae a
ratio of "volume of casing", and plot this against volume of
casing we obtain curves which will show in a aarisfaotory manner
the relationship existing between these two factors for any given 
length of gap.
As the "volume of passage" is very small compared with 
the "volume of the casing", the figure representing the ratio will 
have a very small value.
We can overcome this difficulty by expressing the 
"volume of passage" in cubic inohes and the "volume of casing" in 
cubic feet the result being the,"volume of passage" in cubic 
inohes, required for each cubic foot of "volume of eating," and 
any particular length of gap.
Calculations on this basis have been made and a table 
compiled (table IV), from whioh the curves shown in fig. 9 were 
■ plotted, avowing relationship for lengths of gap between 1 inch 
and 100 inohes.
In the calculations "lengths of gap" are regarded as 
■critical lengths", it follows therefore, that the "Volume of 
passage" given fdr any particular"length of gap", is that which 
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inflammable gaseous mixture. Consequently If we fix the perimeter 
of a casing of given volume (and regard the perimeter a3 a 
"oritioal length "), reference to the curves will give the "volume 
of passage" in cubic inches per cubic foot of"volume of casing," 
required at the length of gap, equivalent to the perimeter, if 
flame-proof conditions are to hold. Having obtained this figure, 
th® total"volume of passage" for the casing under consideration 
ia readily found.
In fig. 10 a family of curves is shown, absci33ae being 
total "Volume of passage," and ordinates "Breadth of flange." The 
volume of passage is shown for lengths of opening- between 1 inoh 
and 100 Inches.
It naturally follows that if we obtain the "volume of 
passage" required for any particular perimeter and volume from 
fig. 9. reference to fig. 10 will indicate the breadth of flange 
necessary under the circumstances, and knowing the perimeter, 
breadth of flange, and volume of passage, the permissible depth 
of "perimeter gap" (i.e. gap left between flanges all round opening) 
may be easily found.
Figs. 9 and 10, should prove of great use to designers 
of flame-proof casings, when some doubt exists regarding the 
proportioning of breadth of flange, and depth of gap, for any oaaing 
the volume and perimeter of which have been fixed, by the electrical 
gear it Is Intended to house.
Three worked examples are given to illustrate the use of 
the curveai-
Caaing3 of the following dimensions are required to 
house certain eleotrical gearj-
(1) Volume O.Scubio feet, opening at cover, 9 inches by SixdBB
(2) * 0.6 ■ , ■ * » ,12 " " 8 "
(3) » 1.4 * » * * ■'.18 ■ " 12 ■
Find for each the breadth of flange necessary and the 
maximum permissible depth of perimeter gap In order that the
- 25 -
oaalng may be flame proof.
Let Volume of passage in cub.ins.= Vi
o " " casing " ft. = V2
Let ~  “ R
Vl
How R * .’ • Vx S RV2
And FxLxD D = Vi
V 2 and Li are given.
E x F.
Let breadth of flange in inches. » F R and F are found from figs. 9 and 10.




» gap n " • D
V 2 « 0.2 ft.2, L - 2(9 + 6) - 30 ins.
From fig. 9., R, for L - 30 ins, and V2 « 0.2 ft.^ is
given as 5 ins2/ft .2  
Vx s RV2 ■ 5 in.2/ft.^ x 0 .2  ft.2 . l.o ins.2
From fig. 10, F, for L - 30 ins and ■ 1.0 in.^ is given
as 1 .1  inch.
3
• .030 ins.^1 - 1 .0  Ins.L a F. 30 in. x 1.1 ins.
.*. breadth of flange required is 1 .1 inoh and permissible 
perimeter gap is 0.030 inch, (max.)
0 .6  ft.- 2 (1 2 f 8 ) s 40 Ins.
From fig. 9«» R# for L - 40 in. and V 2 » 0.5 ft. 
given as 4 .05 in.2/ft . 2
is
rv2 ^.05 in.2/ft . 2 x 0 .6  ft. • 2.4^ in
From fig. 10, F, for L * 40 ins. and V1 • 2.43 in 
jiven as 1 .55 ins
is
f e 0.0 X  'J'J mo., 1 3- 2.43 in.______  r .039 Ins.
" " LF 40 Ins. x 1.55 ins.
breadth of flange required is 1.55 and permissible perimeter 
gap is 0.039 ins. (max.)
V 2 s 1.4 ft. L s 2(16+ 12) s 60 ins.
From fig. 9, R, for L - 60 ins and V2 ■ 1 .4  ft.2 is 
given as 3*0 in.2/ft . 2
V1 ■ rv2 = 2*0 in.2/ft.2 x 1 . 4  f t . 3 z 4*2 in.2
From fig. 10, F, for L :  60 ins. and Vi -4 .2  in.2 la
given as 1 .75 ins*
- IL- - 4 .2  i n . 266 * rrrrD zr • .040 ins.
breadth of flange required is 1.75 inohes and permissible 
perimeter gap is 0.040 ins.(max.)


















































































IGNITING CURRENT AMD PAS -AG£ OF FLA.i'E:-
This part of the "research" was devoted to investigating 
the effect of igniting currents of various strengths, on mixtures 
of gas near the limits of inflammability.
The small switch box (volume 0.123 oub .ft. flanges 1 incl 
broad) was used in the experiments. A gap O.O56 inch in depth was 
chosen, the critical length being 1 ,6 2 3  inches.
The procedure was exactly similar to that already 
described; An explosive mixture was Introduced into the small box, 
the latter was now placed in the Explosion Chamber and surrounded 
with an explosive atmosphere, after which the switches were closed, 
thereby igniting the interna^ mixture. The results were noted.
By keeping the current constant throughout a series 
of experiments, in which the gas mixtures were varied from the lower 
to the upper explosive limit3, points were obtained above and 
below the most explosive mixture, at which external ignition 
could not be produced, although the mixtures ignited was within 
the explosive range.
On repeating the above experiments, using a higher 
value of Igniting current other point3 were obtained at which 
flame capable of oausing external ignition no longer passed.
The points ao obtained might be conveniently referred 
to as the "flame passing limits", and the range of mixtures between 
the points as the "flame passing range.”
The currents used in the experiments varied from 
3 amperes to 7-3 amperes, and it was found that the "flame passing 
range" increased until igniting current had a value of 30 amperes.
The "range" did not increase above this value of igniting ourrent, 
and was found to be nearly coincident with the "explosive range".
Two seta of points, representing the "lower® and "upper" 
limits "of the "flame passing range", were thus obtained and are 
shown plotted in fig. II.
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A few of the result# are given in the following table,
TABLS V .
The Effect of Strength of Igniting Current on Passage of 
Flame from Explosions of Gas and Air Mixtures.













.027 2.700 >•5 1" .058 I .625 f Yes. No.
.026 " 3.5 B n n B Yes.
.027 " 14.5 n n R B Yes
.025 » 14.5 0 n b B No
.024 " 2 2. B B B R No Lower
Limit.
.025 « 2 2. n R R Yes
.025 • 60 R R R R Yea
.024 » 78 « B N No
.031 2.700 16 1 " .056 1 .6 2 5 f Yes Yes
.032 « 16 n n n R No
.032 * 23 n a n B Yes
Upper
.033 23 M H B fl No Limit.
.0325 ■ 40 a a a I Yes
.034 40 a n n H No
.033 60 - a B B R No
.034 78 R B B R No
CONCLUSIONS & DEDUCTIONS: - '
The opening between the flanges was the minimum length 
of opening for passage of flame at the depth of gap used, 
consequently inorease or reduotion of the amount of coal gas in the 
mixture, by reducing the potential heat of the mixture would in 
itself be sufficient to prevent passage of flame.
The existence of the "flame passing range* is not 
surprising. As already pointed out any alteration of the conditions 
of experiment when working with mixtures near the explosive limits.
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affects those limits.
Bsrthelot In his experiment observed that the exploslbll: 
jity of mixtures near the limits was increased, when ignition 
was accompanied by shook which produced raechanioal disturbance 
of the mixture. It follows therefore that as the igniting current 
ia increased the disturbance set up when the fuse is blown will 
increase, so the rate of propagation of flame will increase and 
time rate of development Of pressure will be relatively greater.
Weak mixtures will therefore burn with greater rapidity as the 
igniting current is increased, and conditions may be such that 
flame capable of causing ignition will be projected through 
the opening between the flanges. Points will be reached above 
and below the most explosive mixture where the mechanical disturb: 
:ance is no longer capable of producing such marked effects, and 
these points will be very near, if not coincident with, the 
explosive limits of the mixtures used.
In the experiments the range was a maximum when the 
Igniting current reaohed a value of 40 amperes, and increase of 
value of current beyond this did not widen the range. In Fig.
11 the results obtained are shown in the form of a graph.
Since the phenomenon is observable only at limit 
mixtures under abnormal igniting conditions and is apparent only 
when the length is increased beyond the critical length for the 
particular gap, it follows that if the gap ie 3uch that flame 
from the most explosive mixtures is effectively cooled in passing 
through the gap no fear need be entertained regarding the possibility 
of external ignition by fuses blowing Under considerable overload.
A few experiments similar to those described above 
w«re carried out with gaps of 0.073 inch and 0 .0 4 0 inch, and tie 
results, in general, confirmed those already obtained.
COAL DUST:-
The effect produced by addition of coal dust to the 
gas mixtures.
The question of ignition of coal dust in addition to
29 -
gas mixtures is one that must bs considered. Where designed 
openings are left in casings, entry cf fine coal dust will 
inevitably occur, if the apparatus is used in a coal mine. In 
all electrical apparatus, its presence ie undesirable, since faulty 
electrical contact etc. will bs produced, if the quantity of dust 
is excessive. The dust will al3o lodge in the opening and might 
prevent, or hinder, the effective operation of protective measures.
coal duat in the casing and between the flanges, in addition to 
explosive gas mixtures, and to determine whether the conclusions 
arrived at using gaa mixtures alone, would have to be modified 
to embrace the el'fsot of added dust, a large number of experiments 
ware carried out.
A sample of coal was obtained and ground to pass through 
a 200 meah sieve.
Proximate analysis performed in duplicate gave the 
following average results.
Volatile Matter........ -22$ ( Volatile Hydrocarbons.... 2 4 .2$
Coke...... . v .  ........... 68$ ( Moisture,................... 7*8$
QUANTITY OF DUST ADDEDt-
It was decided to add dust in the proportion of one
ounce per oubio foot of air apace, a quantity muoh in excess of
that necessary for propagation of flame in a dusty atmosphere.
The reason was, of course, to make the teat as severe as possible.
The box used in the experiments was the small box
I m
already described, having volume of 0 .1 2  cub. ft., and flanges one 
inoh broad. The gap chosen was O .0 5 8 inch deep and 1 .625+ inches 
long. This gap produces external ignition with gas mixtures.
In the initial experiments dust was placed between 
the flanges at the gap. It was found to have no appreciable effect, 
because when ignition of duat and gaa took plaoe inside, the 
casing, the duat between the flanges was blown out and was not




Ignited. The placing of dust between the flanges was therefore 
abandoned on this account.
The moat severe conditions possible under the 
circumstances, were imposed on the box but only in a few cases 
out of a large number of experiments was it possible to obtain 
external ignition. In two of the oases external ignition was 
effected through the bursting of the box by the internal ignition, 
direct communication with the out3ide mixture being thus afforded. 
The bolts securing the cover of the casing were occasionally 
sheared also.
When the cover was removed after an experiment, dense 
yellowish fumes, the product of partial distillation of the coal, 
were found. It would seem therefore that this evolution of dlstillai 
:tion products etc., had some effect in preventing passage of flame. 
If however we consider the bursting of the two boxes, and the 
number of bolts that were sheared, we might bs inclined to suggest 
that dust added to the gas mixture increases the pressure attained 
by the explosion.
We might visualise what takes place in the box when 
coal duat and coal gas present in explosive proportion are ignited. 
Here we have two combustible substances and a oertain amount of 
air. When the fuse "blows0, ignition of the gas mixture ooours and 
a dust cloud is raised. Part of this duat must be consumed 
directly, part will be volatilised, while a certain amount will 
be expelled, probably unburned, from the casing. The products 
of this partial distillation cannot be consumed sinoe the oxygen 
has been used up in the explosion of gaa and burning of dust, so 
that the box will be filled with spent gases and volatile matter - 
not a very suitable medium for flame propagation. The mixture 
that issues from the box will therefore donsiat of coal duat, 
distillation products and gases from the explosion. Condensation 
and cooling of the contents of the box immediately follows, and 
part of the surrounding mixture will rush in through the opening.
The mixture in the box may now be inflammable but the temperature
T a b l e  V L
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has fallen below the ignition temperature, so further ignition 
does not oocur.
It is therefore evident that the dust cloud raised 
has a damping effect on the flame of the gas explosion, and the 
partial distillation will cause a further fall in temperature, 
so that gases issuing from an explosion will have a temperature 
considerably lower than those Issuing from an explosion of a 
gas mixture only.
The quantity of coal dust equivalent to one ounce per 
oubic foot of air space, amounted to 3*5 g®s. This amount of 
dust was practically all consumed by ten internal ignitions. Of 
the ten ignitions, only the last one, in general produced external 
ignition, being practically, a gas ignition.
CONCLUSIONS:-
To sum up, we might say that the results obtained 
indicate that the addition of coal dust does not increase the 
danger of passage of flame, but rather retards it, while the 
pressure developed by the explosion is increased.
MEASUREMENT OF PRESSURE DEVELOPED BY EXPLOSIONS:-
An important part of this investigation lie3 in the 
measurement of pressures developed by explosions of gas and 
air mixtures. So far, the only point considered has been the 
prevention of passage of flame oapable of igniting the external 
mixture. It is apparent however that results are incomplete 
without sone knowledge of the pressures developed at the various 
•critical lengths.'
We have already mentioned that adequate pressure release 
and prevention of passage of flame are the aims of all protective 
measures. From a "flame-proof" point of view these two factors 
directly oppose each other, for, while a large escape area lowers 
pressure it increases danger of passage of flame, and a small 
escape area reduces possibility of passage of flame but tends 
to development of high pressures. Both factors must therefore 
be considered when we intend to leave designed gaps between 
flanges, since obviously, the moat suitable gap will be that
Table MJJ
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which gives the lowest possible pressure, consistent with
preservation of "flame proof" properties.
How, as the critical length inoreases, the "escape
area" (i.e. product of "critical length and "depth of gap) inoreaaea
so that we may expeot lowering of the pressure developed by the 
explosion of the internal mixture. It has already been shown 
that the flange area exposed, inoreases, and that cooling by 
Contact with the flanges becomes predominant, as the "critical 
length" increases.
v - v .
•#''y Apparently then, when cooling is brought about by
v . contact with large metallio surfaces, we may expect greatly reduced 
t£; pressures, whereas when the oontaot area between the flanges is
•v.Xv.v*.; . •
t7/:' email, higher pressures may be expected.
7' It has been pointed out that when the "escape area" is 
email, the flange area exposed is small, and that cooling is effeot: 
fed mainly by expansion.
Ip- Under these circumstances, we must expect relatively
| high pressures.
In the measurement of the preesures three factors were 
v-.loonsidered via, gap left between the flanges, gas quantity present, 
;;Ufnd value of igniting current. Each factor can be varied at will,
*ad in the following experiments each has been varied in turn while
P§:. -
the other two remained oonstant.
Thus, three sets of results were obtained.
Sff* (a) Pressures developed with gas quantity and gap




(b) Preesuree developed with gap and igniting ourrent 
oonstant, and gas quantity varied.
(o) Pressures developed with igniting ourrent and gas 
quantity oonstant, and gap varied.
The apparatus used was similar to the small switoh box 
tlready referred to, and pressures were measured by means of a 
•team-engine indicator (see fig. 17.) No attempt was made to obtain 
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experiments a few were obtained by realeasing the 'drum1 of the 
indicator, at the moment of Ignition. Typical indicator cards 
are reproduced in figs. 13 and 1 6 .
The results of these experiments are best shown by
means of graphs and in addition to the tabulated results curves
are shown in figs, 12, 13 and 1 4, in which the effects of the 
various factors on pressure development can be readily seen.
When igniting ourrent is the variable factor the graph 
of pressure is a straight line parralel to the abscissa., indicating 
that the value of the igniting currant has not any effect on the 
ultimate maximum pressure of the explosion. This, of course, is 
what we might expect. The only effect we might look for, would be,
that the pressure ri33 might be more rapid with a large current
than with a small igniting current.
With gap and ourrent constant and gas quantity varied 
the effect on pressure is naturally, very marked. We traverse 
the entire explosive range of gas mixtures in this series, and 
observe how the pressure rises rapidly from the lower limit of 
explosibility to the mo3t explosive mixture, and then, as the gas 
quantity is increased beyond this point the pressure falls rapidly 
until the upper limit is reached at which pressure is very low.
By keeping the gap length, current and gas quantity 
constant, and varying the depth of gap from 0 .1 0  inch to 0 .0 1  inch, 
a set of pres'ure records were obtained from which a curve was 
plotted. In thie graph we observe particularly the effect of 
decreasing the depth of gap, or in this case oontinually reducing 
the "escape area" between the flanges. As the "escape area" is 
reduced we gradually approach the totally enclosed state in which 
no provision is made for escape of gases or pressure release, and 
hanoe pressure developed ia a maximum* It follows therefore that 
as this state ia approached the pressure must increase.
PRESSURE^ DEVELOPED AT CRITICAL LENGTHS:-
The pressures developed by different gas mixtures at 
critical lengths were also measured and ourvea plotted from the
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result (see fig. 19.) The ourves show that the pressure falls 
by small amounts until the gap ia O .0 4  inoh. At depths of gap 
less than 0 .0 4  inch the pressure fall is very rapid until vre car. 
leave a gap all round the perimeter. The pressure recorded under 
the latter conditions is only about 6 lbs per square inch.
We have referred to oooling by contact, and expansion, 
and desoribed the conditions under whioh each predominates. There 
must, however, be a oertaln point at whioh each is equally effeotive1 
and above and below this point some characteristic must become 
apparent to indicate the factor which is ohiefly responsible 
in effecting cooling of the gases from the explosion.
We have shown that pressure is a minimum when cooling 
by contact predominates, consequently when a point is reached 
at which pressures begin to fall rapidly it must be evident that 
the expansion effect no longer controls cooling.
The position of this point is readily detected in 
fig. 20 in which ordinates are "maximum pressures at oritical 
lengths" and abscissae are depths of gap.
The point at which change occurs is 0 .0 4  inoh depth 
of gap. We may reasonably assume then, that cooling by contact 
begins to assert itself from .04 inch gap downwards and that at 
gape over 0.04 inch, expansion is the chief cause of cooling, 
while the effect of each is apparently equal at this particular 
depth of gap.
PRESSURES DEVELOPED WHEN COAL DUST IS ADDED TO THE GAS FIXTURES:-
Coal duat, in the proportion used in previous experiment* 
was added to the box and a set of pressure records obtained. The 
results are shown plotted in fig. 1 4 , and indicate that the 
Pressure is higher than when gaa mixtures alone are used. Under 
favourable conditions very much higher pressures than those indicate* 
®*y he recorded. 
fllMERAL CONCLUSIONS:-
It haw been shown that strength of igniting ourrent 
does not affect the ultimate pressure attained by an explosion in
-  35 -
a partially closed vessel.. VJa have also seen that the addition 
of ooal clust inoreases the pressure developed. The moat important 
results however are those showing the pressures developed at 
•critical lengths’. These results help materially in deciding 
which method of protection to adopt. It ia olearly evident 
that cooling by contact with large cooling surfaces is preferable 
to cooling by expansion, or any method in which resistance is 
offered to the escaping gases, as, for example, in passing through 
a Special device. It ia of importance to note that large cooling 
surfaces, from which the 'escape area' is small, do not completely 
satisfy the requirements, because pressure developed varies inverses 
sly as the ’escape area'. In employing flanges with the 
proper perimeter gap between them, we provide a large cooling 
surface and a large 'escape area', and, consequently combine 
effective cooling with adequate pressure release. In this respect 
flange protection is superior to all protective devices* because!, 
as we have already pointed out, it is doubtful whether the two faotoa 
can be satisfactorily combined in the same appliance.
WEBBED COVERS:-
*
While carrying out a series of experiments in which 
a stronger type of box was used it was observed that critical 
lengths were slightly greater than in the other casings of same 
dimensions. The breadth of flange was the same in each case, and 
the volumes were also approximately equal, so that we might have 
expected similar critical lengths. The material of which eaoh 
oasing was made was oast iron, therefore possibility of different 
rates of conduction of heat cannot be entertained.
In the stronger type of box there were several internal 
webs. This, while strengthening the box increased the internal 
surface area by approximately 30 sq. inches. It follows therefore 
that a larger cooling surfaow was presented to the hot gases of the 
•xplosion so that the temperature reached would be leas than in 
the box in whioh there were no webs. The gases issuing at the 
opening would be at a lower temperature than under the old
f*ic5 1 S m a L C  S w i t c h *  B o x  InIith H j « t i h c  C o i l  
A n d  T h e r m o - C o u p l e  In P o s i t i o n  A s  U s e d  
In H e a t e d  C a s  INC, E r . P E R i P l E N T S
I n t e r n a l  T e m P e p a t  u  « e  O r  C a s i n o  L°F]
f’ l o S ? : - C u uv£ S h o w i h c  S e d u c t i o n  In Met W e i g h t  Or Nutuhe Is/it-n Rise /t*
TeMPf ahtuhe Or C « s I N 6 
In it ia l TEMPeKATwRE Or Casino 5 5 '  F
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oonditions, therefore an inorease in the 'escape area" would be 
nece9aary before flame passed to ignite the external mixture.
The critical lengths would therefore be greater in 
the stronger box.
The inorease in length was slight but very marked. 
Further investigation is necessary before definite conclusions 
can be arrived at, but the results are oertainly indicative of 
what might be done in the direction of cooling gases before they 
pass between flanges or through protective devices.
Internal, and external webs, are already applied to 
oasings of certain machinery used in minea, the purpose of the 
application being to prevent excessive rise in temperature under 
working conditions. The idea could be readily extended to 
switch-gear casings etc., to increase the cooling surface present: 
:ed to hot gases in event of an explosion occurring, and thereby 
considerably assist in maintaining the flame-proof features of 
the apparatus.
HEATED CASINGS:-
Up to the present the experiments described have all 
been performed with the oasings at the atmospheric temperatures 
prevailing at the time of experiment. Strictly speaking therefore, 
the results obtained, and the conclusions arrived at, apply only 
to ordinary atmospheric oonditions.
The rise in temperature of eleotrical apparatus depends
on the working conditions, and may be such that temperature of
100°C and over may be reached.
Eleotrical defects in the apparatus, will of course 
give rise to abnormally high temperatures at certain parts of 
oasings, and in the following discussion are considered apart 
from temperature rise due to working conditions.
The problem that confronts us, is, to determine^ whether
aPparatua, flame-proof at atmospheric temperatures, still retains
Its properties at higher temperatures. If the properties are not
^  f l L V A N O M E  T £ R
D c f l c c t /o n s .
^ < 323:-Th C R  n o - C o u p l e  C a l i b r a t i o n  C 0 rv£S
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retained, we must consider what modifications are necessary to 
counteract the effects of the increase in temperature.
Now, ample cooling surface is essential in all protective 
measures, and the lower the temperature of the surface, the more 
efficiently will it function.
Eaoh degree rise in temperature, will therefore reduce 
the efficiency of the cooling surface, and a point will ultimately 
he reached at which the cooling power will be negligible, so far 
as the cooling of hot gases is concerned.
As the temperature of the walls of the casing increase, 
their cooling effect on the gases, at ignition will not be so 
marked, and higher temperatures may be reached by the gases, if 
the vessel is totally closed.
The behaviour of the gaseous contents of the oasing, 
under an inorease in temperature, must also be taken into aooount.
Let us oonsider a totally closed vessel, into which a 
gaeeous mixture at atmospheric temperature and pressure, has been • 
introduced. Awoording to Charles 'Law if the temperature of the 
oasing be raised, the pressure of the gases will risqkbove 
atmospherio pressure, while the volume remains practioally 
oonstant. If the contents of the vessel were explosive, higher 
pressures would be developed on ignition, under the latter 
oonditions.
Now, if the vessel were only partly dosed, and commubi: 
:oatlon with the outside wa3 effected, say through a small opening 
between flanges, totally different results would be obtained.
Free expansion is possible in this case and pressure 
remains oonstant. It follows therefore that with each degree 
rise in temperature a certain volume of gas , will leave
the vessel. The volume of gas remaining in the vessel will be 
the same (approximately) at all temperatures, but the nett weight 
of gaa will be reduced aa the temperature rises. We see therefore 
that if the original mixture was combustible, it follows that as
Ioa'F /iq'f I7(>cF
 Ti«ie In MiNwres
Tf^Pf^«ro<(e I* F»NHtN»£,r Decaffs
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temperature rises, the potential heat of the mixture remaining, 
decreases. (See fig. 2.2.,)
It is thus evident that while the efficiency of the
cooling surface is reduced with rise in temperature, in the event 
of an explosion ooourring in the vessel, less heat has to be 
dissipated, so that it may atill be capable of preserving the 
flame-proof properties so essential to safeworking.
In the case of cooling by expansion through a small 
opening or gap, we must consider the state of the mixture rather than 
the state of the vessel containing it.
We have seen that the potential heat of the mixture 
decreases as the temperature of the casing rises, therefore pressure
developed by the explosion will be less, consequently the rate
of expansion will be reduced.
The decrease In rate of expansion will of course be 
reflected in the range of cooling effected, snd were it net for 
the fact that the potential heat of the mixture is leas than 
normal, we might expect the temperatures of the expelled gasea 
to be higher than when the initial temperature was that of the 
surrounding atmosphere.
In the actual experimental work the greatest difficulty 
was to devise a suitable method of heating the casing to the 
desired degree and maintaining it at that temperature.
Obviously the moat auitable means was eleotrical, and 
a ni-ohrome coil similar to thoae fitted in electrical fires 
was used. Temperature reoord3 were taken with a Copper-Constantan 
thermo-oouple, calibration curves are shown in fig. 2}.
The small box already referred to was adapted for the 
oxperiments, being suitably bored to receive the heating coil 
and the thermo-couple. The arrangement ia shown in Fig. 21 and 
was found to be the moat suitable under the circumstances.
In the initial experiment* the usual explosive mixture 
was admitted to the box at atmospheric temperature, then heating 
operations were commenced, and continued until the required degree
Table V/<(
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of temperature was reached. During the heating atage gaa was 
admitted to the explosion ohamber till the correct explosive 
mixture was obtained, the condition being adjusted so that the 
required temperature was reached when the correct quantity of 
gas had been admitted.
The internal explosions produced under the above
conditions, were generally very feeble, and in a number of
experiments no internal ignition was obtained.
The current passing in the coll was adjusted by means
of a rheostat and in determining the value to be used for heating
purposes,the coil was first brought to red heat, then the resistance
was increased until visible light was no longer emitted. The coil
omust therefore have been at a temperature of over 300 C.
At this temperature prolonged contact with the gaseous 
mixture, would tend to oxidation of the combustible constituents, 
with production of a non-explosive or feebly explosive mass.
It is therefore evident that ga3 oannot bs admitted
to the box while current ia passing through the heating coil.
The casing of course never attained the temperature of 
the coil, and to determine its temperature at anytime during the 
period of heating, and after the heating current was out off, a 
number of time-temperature observations were made for different 
values of heating ourrent. Time-temperature curves were plotted 
from the observations, and by referring to them it was a simple 
»a$ter to select a rate of heating and cooling so that the required 
temperature of casing would be attained at a oertain specified 
time after the heating ourrent was out off. See fig. 2 4.
During the cooling 3tage gas was admitted to the oasing 
and then to the explosion chamber, the operation being completed 
when the oasing had reached the required temperature.
By adopting this preoedure the possibility of oxidation 
°f the internal mixture was eliminated, but another undesirable 
feature was introduced.
As the box cooled, contraction of its gaseous contents
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would occur, and gas would enter from the outside to maintain 
equilibrium of pressure. It follows therefore that the internal 
mixture -would gradually alter in composition as the casing cooled.
Somewhat similar results may be expected when the 
external mixture is admitted* before gas is passed into the small 
box under test.
In this oase there will be a mixture containing a small 
quantity of coal gaa, introduced by diffusion and contraction 
into the casing, before the real explosive mixture is admitted.
We therefore do not know the exact composition of the 
mixture in the casing, on account of the changes continually taking 
place, so that while every effort was made to have the internal 
and external mixtures of same composition it is doubtful if this 
was ever attained.
The experiments were oarried out at critical lengths 
for gaps from .106 inch to O.OpQ inoh, so that any change would be 
readily detected, because the margin of safety is necessarily very 
small at critioal lengths, and any slight alteration in the 
oonditions of experiment, might produce large differences in 
results.
RBSULTS:-
The experiment showed very clearly that the casings
remained "flame-proof" until temperatures from 103°F to 11Q°F were
reached. At temperatures above 11Q°F external ignition could be
produced on every ocoa9ion until by continual heating the casing
o , ohad reached a temperature of 155 F - loQ F, when flame capable 
of causing internal ignition no longer passed.
Further heating of the oasing did not seem to alter the 
results obtained at l6o°F.
CONCLUSIONS:-
It has been pointed out that the higher the initial 
temperature of the oasing, the less will be the oooling when 
ignition takes plaoe, so that the maximum temperature attained 
by the explosion will probably be higher than normally.
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We have also observed that deorease In potential 
heat of mixture accompanies ri3e in temperature of the casing, 
if the latter contains an opening communicating with the outside.
Now, these two factors operate at the same time, the 
former increasing in power as the temperatures rise3 above atmos: 
jpherio, while the latter becomes more apparent aa temperature 
increases.
There is therefore every possibility that we may 
reach a temperature when "temperature increase of explosions" has 
a more powerful influence then "the reduction in potential heat 
effect."
When thi9 state o? affairs is reached, external 
ignition will occur, and will continue until the potential heat 
of the mixture ia reduoed to such an extent that the maximum 
temperature attained (taking into account the inorease due to 
initial temperature) ia relatively low.
Under these conditions cooling by contact or expansion, 
will once more assert itself and thereby prevent external ignition.
In figure 22, percentage loss of explosive mixture is 
plotted on a base of temperature in °F., the initial temperature 
being taken as 55°F, and a barometrio pressure of 29*8 Ins is 
assumed throughout.
From this graph we observe that the percentage loss of 
mixture is 9.75 per cent at 110°F and 16.74 per cant at l6o°F and 
if the above hypothesis is oorrect these points probably represent 
the upper and lower limits of a flame-passing zone.
TABLE IX. CALCULATION OF LOS?.
toes of Mixture with Z°*' JasinS 19 °*12> oub. ft.
' Rise in Temperature. e-S* Fig* volume at atmospheric temp, of 










J O •0055 2.84
-SO .0079 6.42





r .1 1 1 0 cub. ft.— • w y * A W *. . 0.1111 oub. ft. at 55°F and 2 9.8 "Bar. 
occupies 0.125 cub. ft. at 110°F add 
29.8" Bar.
. . volume (at atmos. pressure and temp.) 
that is lost • 0 .1 2 5 - 0 .1 1 1 0
8 Q.Q12 oub. ft. 
t't Per Cent. Loss - ,012 x 100 = 9*75 per
•125 ~l cent.
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The margin existing between ignition and non-ignition 
of the external mixture must be very small before the effect 
described above can be shown. Under the conditions of experiment 
stated above the effect was clearly observed.
To determine whether the effect v?aa observable when 
the oasing contained explosive firedamp mixtures a quantity of 
methane was generated from Aluminium Carbide, purified and stored 
in a gaa tank. The nece33ary amount of methane was drawn from 
the tank as required.
The results from this series of experiments closely 
ressembled those obtained with the coal gas explosive mixtures, as 
will be seem from the tabulated results at the end of the theaia.
ANALYSES OF GAS MIXTURES USED IN THE EXPERIMENTS?-
Samples drawn from the casing were analysed periodically. 
It is of interest to compare the results of analyses of samples, 
drawn when the oasing was at atmospherio temperature, with those 
drawn after the gas had been in contact with the heated surface 
for a considerable time.




Temperature of casing 
when gas was admitted.
Temperature of casing o
.when sample was withdrawn. 60 F.





Time between admission of 
gaa and drawing of sample.
(a)
Sample 4 5 .8 cos.
K.O.H. 4 5 .4  cos....4ocaC02
Br.fK.O.H 4 5 .3 0 0 3....1 cos.
Crr̂ n*
Pyro. >8.05 ocs...7 .2500a.









Sample 4 0 .00ccs. Sample 6 3.40oca.
KOH >9*66 0 0s. . . . . 34003. 0 0 g KOH 6 2.90ocs. . 5ce3CQ2
Br.f KOH 59*5 6 ccs. .... 10co.3CmHn Br.+KOH 62.70cca. . 2 0 0 3 0 ^




2 6 .3 6 oca.
. .2.7S0CS.CO2 









O2 In Sample s 6 .32 00a.
02 after oomb. ® .6 3 cca. 
•
. . 02 uaed in
comb. = 5.69 cca.
02 in Sample n 10.02 oca.
0 2 after oomb. - 1 .0 0  oca. 
•
. . 0 2 uaed
in comb. - 9.02 cca.
Ho ■ Total Contraction - 02 uaed H~ * Total Contraction - 02c. in oomb. used in Comb.
Hg ■ 9,75 cca. - 5*6$ cca. H2 s 15*70 cca. - 9.02 oca.
H2 = 4 .1 0  ocs. H2 s 6 .6 8  oca.
CH.'+ s 2 x Cent. - C02 formed - H? 
3
OH/ m 2 x Cont.-COjformed _.. ----------------- h2
CH4
0H4
m 2 X 9.79 - 2.78 _ , 1 c h 4 * - 6 .6 8
■ $ .6  - 4 *1 • 1 * 5  ocs. CH4 » 9.13 - 6 .6 8 • 2 .4 4  cos.
CO = co2 - ch4 CO • co2 - ch4
CO . 2 .7 8 - 1 .5
3•vl1•00
CO •  1.28 cca. CO m 1 .5 3  003.
RESULT.
0 .8#  C02 0.792 co2
0 .2 ^  CA . 0.312 CmHn
10.252 h2 • 10.53* H2
r. ■ 3.75^  CH4 3-36* CH4
3.20£C0 2.442 CO
15.802 02 15*302 02
..  65.-fMl-.fc............... M i & L * *
1 0 0 .0 0 " * 1 0 0 ,0 0 _
, V< 1 .* .1 . f •&: ‘v
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No.2. (a)
Barometric Pressure 30.54" Sample
Atmospheric Temperature. 57°F. XOII
Temperature of Casing 
when gas was admitted. >00°F.
3r.f KOH
Temperature of casing 
when sample was withdrawn. 147°F.
Pyro.
Quantity of Coal Gas ad: 
{Biitted to casing. .Q295cub.
RESULT:-
Time between admission of 










Sample 4 1.0 0ocs.
(0 )
Sample 4 0 .IO0C9.
KOH 4 0,10CC3. KOH 39.30ooa. ...0.30oc3.C02
Br.+KOH 40.QOoca. ... 0.lOccs. . Br.+KQH 39*20 cos. ...O.lOoos.Cg
Comb. 30.40CC3. ... 9 .60ccs.Cont. Comb. 2 9.80ccs. ...9-4 000 9. 
Cont.




Pyro. 2 7-60coa. ... 0 .40003.0 2 
left.
Pyro. 2 7 .lOcca.
02 in 3am.pl e •  5 .9 3 CCS • 02 in sample - 5 .8  CCS•
02 after oomb. * 0 .4 0  ocs.
«
. . 02 used in oomb.a 5 -5&
02 after oomb. - G O  oca. 




Total Contraction - 02 used in H,. - Total Contraction - 02
comb. uaed in Comb.
9.60 0 0 8. - 5.58 OC0 .
4.02 CC3.
H2 * 9*40 ccs. - 5*5- ocs. 




2 x Total Cont.- CO2 formed _H CH„ - 2 x Total Cont.-COp formal
3 ^ 4 r  —  -H2"
ch4 - 2x9.4^ - 2.40 . 3 .9
5.6 - 4.02 s 1.56 ooa- CH4 - 5 .4 6  - 3.9 • I .5 6  cos.
- 4 .02
00 • co2 - ch4
CO B 2.40 - 1.58
CO • C02 - ch4




















COMPARISON GF AVERAGE RESULTS OF ANALYSES OF
'* Bar. 30.24. At. Temp.60°F. Bar. 30.54.At Temp. 57° F.
Casing at Atmospheric temp. Casing at 300°F when gas ad:
imitted.
147°5’ when sample with: 
:drawn.
co2 0.834 COg 2.114
®®Hjj 0.254 CffiHjj .264
H2 10.394 18.094 -  Hg 9.744
ch4 3.804 ch4 3.664
CO 2.824 CO 2.044
02 15.804 02 14.494
Hg 66.114 81.914 Ng 67.504
IS.014
81.994
EXPLOSIVE MIXTURES gQHTAININO METHANE AND TRACES OFHYDRQGE|fc
(a)Barometric Pressure. 2 9.42*
o Sample 3 2 .8  oca.
Atmospheric Temperature.5 9 .0 F.
KOH 32.8 ocs.
Temperature of Casing o
_when gas was admitted. 5 9 .0 F. Br.f KOH 32.8 oce.
Temperature of Casing pyro. 26.93 oos.5.87cc1
when sample was with: 0 ... 02
drawn. 59*0
RESULT:-
Tine between admission 
of gas and drawing of . 17-924 Og
.sample._____________  1 minute. __________________________
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(b)
Sample 2 5 .20 oce.
Comb. 20.50 ocs.
KOH 19.00 ocs. .
Pyro. 18.60 cca. .
(0 )
Sample 21.6oocs.
Comb. 17*60o o s .
. 6.2co»Tot.Cont.KOH l6.30cca. ... 5 .500s.
Tot.Con.
. 0 . 4  ocs.02 left.Pyro. I6.00cce. .. 0 .3  ocs.
Op left.
02 present in sample
02 after combustion.
.*. 02 used in com;
:bustion.
— 4 .î*** ccs •
■  O . 4O 0C 3.
- 4.11 ocs.
02 in sample - 3.32 ocs.
02 after com:
:buation. - .3 0 ocs.
02 uaed in combustion a 3 • 5«£c3
Let T 9 total contraction due to 
oombustion and absorption of 
C0s> formed.
* 4  T - 20
H2 - |  X ^  . 2x5-52
H » 2.1.2 _ 7 g,* 7 • 06-7*04let 0 m Oxygen used in combustion.
Then = ^  T - 20 H^ s 0 .0 4  ocs.
CH4 . 0 - I  T
CH4 =  0 - J  *
ch4 « 3 .5 2  • 3 .5 2  - 1 .7$
CH4 k  1.76 oce.
h2 . j *  2
H2 k  .0 4  cos.
8.22
8 .2 6  - 8.22
OH/ s 4.11 - 6.2
.... ~ T
OH^ - 2.05 ccs.
= 4.11 - 2.06 RESULT:-
0 .09$ m 2 
8 .14$ ch4 
1 7 .92$ 02
RESULT:-
0.l6f« H2 17.92^02 




Temperature of casing when 0 
gas was admitted. 300 F.
Temperature of oasing when 0 
•ample was withdrawn. 182 F.
Time between admission of 
gas and drawing of sample 9 mine.
(a) ’
Sample 34*2 ocs.
Pyro. 28.4 0 0 9. 5.8 0 09.0,.
Result 17*0$ 02
(b)
Sample 23*0 0 0 9.
Pyro. 20.7 ooa. 4.3 oca. 02
Result 1 7 . #  02 ________________
Average Result 17.1$ 02
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(0 ) <d>
Sample 2 9 .4  oca. Sample 6 4 .4  cos.
Comb. 2 4 .2  ccs. Comb. 5 2 .8  ocs.
KOH 22.0 oca. 7*4ccs.Tot.0ont. 
Pyro. 21.9 oca. 0.1 cos.Og left.
KOH 48-25 00a.l6 .i50ce.T0t.
Con.
Pyro. 4 0 .0 5  ocs. 0.2 oca. O2
left.
02 present in Sample 5*02 oca. 0 2 present in Sample 10.9400s.
Og lsft after oomb. 0 .1 0  oca. Qg left after oomb. .20003.
Og used in oomb. 4 .9 2  oca. 02 U3ed in comb. 10.?4oca.
Hg s 4  T “ H2 " | T  - 2o
h2 - j  x 2 ^ 4  - 2 x 4 -9 2  
h2 b z y  6 . 9 .8 4  - 9 .8 6  - 9 .8 4
Hg - .0 2 ocs.
/
Hp - 4 X 16.16 _ 2 x 10.74
- 6j .6  - 2 1 .4 8  
Hg r 21.53 “ 2 1 .4 8 = .05 oos.
CH, * 0 - 1 T
CH4 - 4 .9 2  - 2 ^ 4  8 4-92 - 2 .4 6  
GH4 m 2 .4 6  oca.
CH, - 0 - 1 T 
CH4 s 1 0 .7 4  -16.15
J>
m 10.74 - 5-38
CH4 B 4*36
Results- 0 .08# H? Results- 0.07^Ho
8 .36$ CH4 8 .32$ ch4
17.10$ o2 17.10$ Og
74.4^»2 74*51$ »2
COMPARISON OF AVERAGE RESULTS.
I. Bar 2 9 .4 2 . At temp.$9°F. Bar. 2 9 .3 4* At Temp. 58.0°F.
Casing at Atmospheric Temp. Casing at 300°F when gas ad: 
smitted. Q 
Casing at 182 F when Sample 
drawn.
H2 b 0 .12$ H2 - 0.08$
ch4 . 8.14$ CH4 . 8,34$
1 0 2 « 17.92$ 02 * 17*1Q$
Ng s 73*82$ 82 •74* 48$
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Where heating is primarily due to some electrical 
defect, very high temperatures may be reached and result in 
destruction of insulation eto.
o
If temperature of 300 C, are reached in the presence of 
an explosive mixture of gases, prolonged oontaot with the heated 
source will tend to oxidation of the combustible constituents with 
probable production of a non-explosive mass.
With higher temperatures the rate of heat production 
due to oxidation, may be greater than the rate of heat dissipation, 
and if thi9 abnormal state of affairs be allowed to continue in: 
:flammation of the gas mixture will oocur.
However, the smell, smoke, etc., which must be produced 
under such circumstances, will direct attention to the cause 
of the disturbance and should result in closing down of maohinery 
eto., until the defect is remedied.
PERMISSIBLE AMOUNT OF WEAR AT BEARINGS:-
With "protected" motors we have to consider the possibll: 
:ity of passage of flame between the shaft and bearing, in event 
of excessive wear.
From consideration of results already obtained we are 
of the opinion that with plain bearings or ball bearings, the 
length of bearing necessary to support the shaft and armature or 
rotor, ie more than actually required to prevent passage of flame.
The wear of bearing and shaft will produce a cresoent 
shaped gap, the maximum depth of whioh will be the difference in 
diameters of the bearing and shaft.
If the length pf shaft were say, 4 inches, the gap 
teoessary for passage of flajpe along the shaft, to produce external 
igniton would be from 3/16th.■ to i".
In aotual praotioe suoh wear would never be permitted, 
slnoe serious electrloal distrubanoea or magnetlo unbalance eto., 
would be produced, and necessitate renewal or repair of bearing.
ECTiCfH
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Experiments were carried out on a box of volume 2.55 
oub. ft., fitted with machined flanges 1.375 inches broad. The 
box was made of cast iron.
A white-metal bearing was cast into an opening in the 
aide of the casing, the dimensions of the bearing being 2 ins. 
internal diameter, and 2 .5  ins. external diameter, and 2. 5 . ins.long.
The steel shaft which fitted into this bearing, was 7
ins. long and projeoted 2 ins. from the bearing,
A groove 0.125 ins. deep was cut in the shaft at the
inside end of the bearing, and in this groove four studs were 
set, to prevent the shaft from being forced out during an Internal 
explosion.
After an explosion in a partially closed vessel such 
as the above, condensation and cooling oocur, and pressure falls 
below atmospheric.
It follows therefore that the shaft would be drawn into 
the casing after an explosion, if some means were not adopted to 
prevent suoh an occurrence.
A screw-stud was therefore set in the shaft at the 
outside of the bearing, and had the desired effeot.
The arrangement is olearly shown in fig. 2 5. One end
of the casing was tapped to receive a gas tap and a plug for
carrying the igniting current cable, and a gap 0 .0 1  ins. in 
depth was left at the flanges.
The procedure was to admit an explosive mixture of ooal 
and air to the casing and ignite it by blowing a "tin" fuse.
The length of fuse used was 1 .5  ins. (No. 2 4. S.W.G.), 
the igniting current being 18 amperes at 250 Volts D.C.
In the initial experiments the bearing and shaft were
* "tight fit", but as the work proceeded, the shaft was gradually
reduced in diameter by predetermined amounts, strict observation
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being kept to ascertain when flame first appeared at the 
bearing.
At each reduction in diameter of shaft, a number of 
teats were carried out in the "open", followed immediately by 
similar testa with the oaaing surrounded by an explosive atmosphere
In none of the latter experiments was it possible 
to produce external ignition.
Occasionally when 'proving* the external mixture after 
an internal explosion, it was possible to see the flame being 
drawn into the casing, between the flanges and also at the bear: 
ting, the action produoing a whistling sound.
In a large number of the tests the sorew stud was 
withdrawn to see whether ignition of gas would occur when the 
.external mixture entered the oaeing in the wake of the shaft, 
after the internal explosion.
Rapid cooling must occur since ignition of the external 
mixture could not be produced in this manner, but often when 
proving the external mixture a slight explosion could be heard 
within the casing, proving the existence of an explosive mixture 
which must have entered when the shaft was "drawn" in.
In the first series of experiments in the $open", a 
white emanation was discernible at the bearing during ignition.
As the shaft was reduced in diameter, this "emanation* 
gradually gave place to distinct brownish flames,with wisps of 
blue and a few "sparks", then as the gap became greater bright 
M d  flames and brilliant sparks were observed during ignition.
When a shaft diameter of 1.945 ias. (giving a gap of 
0*055 ins.) was reached reddish-blue flames extending to the 
end of the shaft were apparent, and as the flames increased in 
luminosity the the white emanation was no longer visible.
After experimenting with thgfehaft dry, a film of oil 
W&8 introduced. The immediate effeot was considerable shorten:
:*ng of the flame, and in many experiments complete quenching of 
flame resulted.
Considerable quantities of smoke were expelled during
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the explosion, and the shaft on the outside of the bearing was 
oovered with globules of oil.
The burning of oil between the shaft and the bearing 
would account for the volumes of smoke at the bearing, while the 
globules of oil found on the shaft would be deposited there from 
spray of oil ejected by the ga393 from the explosion.
After thie observation, it might be suggested that the 
white emanation spoken of above, was merely produota of oombu3tion 
expelled by the explosion. On examining the 3ide of the "explosion 
ohamber" a deposit of grey matter was found directly opposite the 
bearing indicating that the above view is probably oorrect.
The fifth experiment with the shaft reduced to 1.9451noh» 
ended disastrously. The casing burst under the strain of the 
explosion and damaged the explosion ohamber.
Part of the oasing containing the shaft was carried 
thrpugh the end of the ohamber and came to rest 10 feet from it.
On examination it was found that the casing had been 
sheared along the junction of the sides and bottom.
The gap at the bearing (0.055 ins) would never have 
been allowed to form in an aotual machine, since disturbances eto., 
already mentioned would have necessitated renewal and repair before 
the wear had become so marked. \
The results obtained are shown tabulated at the end 
of the thesis.
A smaller box made of cast steel, was now procured and 
adapted for experimental purposes in the manner already described.
The volume of this box was approximately 0.123 oub. ft., with 
flanged 1 inoh broad* The bearing was of brass and of the following j 
dimensions, length 1 .6 2 5 ins., internal diameter 0 .6 2 5  inoh, 
external diameter 0.875 inoh.
The shaft was made of mild steel, and was 4 inches long, \ 
and had a  diameter of 0 .6 2 5  inoh.
The shaft and bearing were intended to represent, a
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controller shaft and bearing.
In the fir3t series of experiments carried out on 
this box the shaft and bearing were a "tight fit."
The bearing was increased in internal diameter by 
degrees until flame capable of causing ignition finally passed.
Sparka and flaws were first observed with a gap of 
0.047 la- At the bearing, the flame being blue in colour and 
extending and extending only a short distance.
As the gap at the bearing was Increased, the flame 
from the explosions increased in length, and changed in colour 
from blue to red, while at very large gaps of the order of 0 .1 0  
inch the flame at the gap was a vivid white colour.
External ignition was ultimately produced when the 
difference in diameter between the shaft anc* bearing was O.I25 ins.
The flame produced in this case extended approximately 
3 inches beyond the bearing.
Such excessive wear would never be permitted in a 
controller ehaft and bearing, since faulty contact of studs, 
fingers etc., would be produced giving endless trouble, and 
necessitating attention before a gap of such dimensions had been 
formed. The results will be found tabulated at the end. 
CONCLUSIONS;-
Although the first eeriee of experiments oould not be 
oompleted, sufficient data was obtained to indicate that in general 
the length of bearing required to support the shaft etc., in more 
than sufficient to prevent passage of flame between the shaft 
and bearing.
The danger of passage of flame need not be the deciding 
factor in determining the permissible amount of wear.
The factor of greatest importance is the prevention 
of electrio&l or magnetlo disturbances, and if strict attention 
be directed to this phase of the question, no fear need be enter; 
Jtained regarding the possibility of ignition of gas by leakage at
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the bearing.
It was found possible to oomplete the eecond aeries of
experiments and the results are an interesting addition to thoee
of the first series. The production of faulty oontact, due to
excessive wear at the bearing, har* been mentioned. Arcing thereby
produced would increase the possibility of ignition of explosive
gas mixtures present in the controller casing. It follows that if
protected
the casing was not adequately/external ignition might be produced, 
but the likelihood of passage of flame between the shaft and bearing 
ie remote, since it is hardly conceivable that apparatus would be 
allowed to fall into such a state of disrepair that a difference 
of 0 .1 2 5 inch in diameters of shaft and bearing existed.
when trouble in making oontaot is experienced, there will be no 
danger of passage of flame between the shaft and bearing, capable 
of igniting an external mixture.
We may oonolude therefore that if beaeings are renewed
1
GENERAL SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS!- 
Cotton gaskets do not constitute a permanent flame proof 
3©int, beoause they deteriorate rapidly in humid 
atmosphere.
2 Flanges 0.5 inch broad do not adequately protect a 
casing. They do not prevent passage of flame-capable of 
oauaing ignition of external gas mixture, unless they 
are machined and in metallic contact. Even under these 
conditions the margin of safety is small.
3 An adequately proteoted casing, maybe rendered unsafe 
by attaohing an inadequately protected piece of apparatus 
to it. All apparatus should be protected to the same
Where flanges are internal (i.e. extend inwards from 
the eide of the casing), all atud holes should be 
bottomed, since omission of a stud would provide direct 
communication with the outside atmosphere.
Ignition may be produced by the operation of overload 
releasee.
Ciooling of ga3ea from an internal explosion may be 
effected by either of two methods, or a combination of 
these two methods. The two Methods are (a) Cooling 
by contact with a large metallic aurfaoe. (b) Cooling 
by expansion through a small orifice. Cooling by 
expansion predominates where the release area is small, 
consequently pressures developed by the explosion of 
gas mixtures are relatively high.
Cooling by contact oocurs when a large release 
area is provided. In this case high pressure develop: 
jment is prevented.
Where a gap is left all round the perimeter of 
an opening which is protected by broad flanges, large 
cooling surface and large release area are combined. 
This state of affairs satisfies the definition of the 
■flame-proof casing definition of the B.E.S.A., since 
cooling of flame is adequate and pressures developed 
are low.
Devioes which provide a large cooling surface 
and a small release area do not completely satisfy the 
requirements.
There is a distinct "flame-passing range" in gas 
mixtures, and for a given depth and length of gap 
between flanges of given breadth, the higher the value 
of the igniting current (till 40 amps, is reached) the
more nearly does the limits of this range approach 
the limits of inflammability of the mixture.
The phenomenon is observable when the "margin 
of safety" is small.
Coal duet present in switch gear casings will probably 
interfere with the electrical continuity, and in event 
of an explosion of gas occurring in the casing, will 
tend to produce slightly higher pressures, but the 
flame-produced is not so intense as from an explosion of 
gas alone.
If the correot proportions of coal dust and 
gas are present very high pressures will be developed.
Increase of value of igniting ourrent has no effect on 
ultimate pressure developed, but probably affects the 
rate of pressure development.
Pressure developed is dependent upon the release area 
provided. Where a large release area is provided a 
large mass of gas is expelled unburned when ignition 
occurs. This tends to reduce temperature and pressure 
attained, since the'se depend on amount of gas consumed.
ffEBBSD COVERS;- The provision of internal webs in
casings ia worth considering. These in addition to 
strengthening the casing increase the cooling surface 
presented to the flame when ignition oocurs. This 
tends to lower the temperatures attained.
HEATED CASINGS:- If oasinga are adequately protected
(i.e. have a good margin of safety) no doubt need be 
entertained regarding the ability of protective measures 
to function properly at temperatures considerably in 
excess of that of the surrounding atmosphere.
Increase in temperature of the oasing, whilst 
reduoing the efficiency of the cooling aurfaoe also
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causes reduction of nett weight of gaa oontained 
in the casing.
This effect more than compensates for loss 
in efficiency of protective measures.
13. PERMISSIBLE WEAR OF BEARINGS:- With plain bearings
the length required to support the load la more than 
necessary to prevent passage of flame along the shaft 
through a gap formed by reasonable sear between shaft 
and bearing.
Before conditions are such that flame oapable 
of oausing external ignition can pass, the eleotrioal 
and magnetic disturbances will be of such a magnitude 
that the apparatus will have to be dosed down for 
renewal of bearings, etc.
With controller shaft bearings the length 
should be from 2-2 times the diameter of the shaft, and 
renewals should be made when the amount of wear is 
such that trouble ie experienced in making contact.
In each oase, if the remainder of the apparatus 
is adequately protected there will bs no danger of 
external ignition.
RECOMMENDATIONS:-
Broad flanges with a gap between them should be provided 
at all joints.
In deciding the depth of gap to be left between flanges 
the volume of the casing, the perimeter of the opening and the 
breadth of flange should all be considered..
Figs. 9 and Jl-o have been drawn from results obtained 
by experiment, and by referring to the curves the maximum depth 
of gap and necessary breadth of flange will be found for volumes 
and perimeter within the limits plotted.
"N
The gap may be provided in a variety of ways, e.g. 
by means of spring washers, or atuda projecting from the aurface 
of the casing flange, but an allowance should be made for 
at the enda of oovers and casing3, otherwise the gapa at the 
ends may be considerably in excess of the safe perimeter gap.
Cast steel casings are preferable to oaet-iron oaainga, 
unleaa strengthening weba are provided in the latter.
In the experiments desoribed in the foregoing pages, 
and in the interpretation of results etc., the practical aspect 
of the question has been considered of primary importance.
The conclusions arrived at and the recommendations 
and suggestions advanced are therefore made on this basis.
At all times every effort was made to reproduce a 
praotioal atmosphere, and have conditions resembling as closely 
as possible, those met with daily in mines.
The author desires to place on record his indebtedness 
to Professor Burns and Professor Parker-Smlth of the Royal 
•Technical College, Glasgow, under whose direction he worked. The
kindly guidance and advice of these two gentlemen were much 
appreciated.
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rrâ J wn


















J ^  ^  NS ! /̂~«o -  $ -S' <o ^
(ft CJ- - ^  ^- <> $ «- <o -o
i l l
HIEli111 £ c S
mn'i^ V) 10*0*0
4
- 8 0 -
O O O
Q f l O
S 2?VS ̂5 ̂
I  u
VS




^  I  V ,  I f ) *1 «/l *» ^  *) V, J? y J2 ,2 fl
2>£ S
V . * Q  , 4
o  V- 2  » /> V r<0
?* k t iuKu, k  <r
k'u ,.
n
r s * a= u, f* 
^-3
in , 1/1 «
U. O _ «j. \-,I* $ a O U. \/> . v i a :  ^
a * 2* ?
*J ui
Srj-
<3. g UJ ’<5! J J r-.S-° I »rj■ °Q V31 <
5 5  «
c &  r  f ? s  s?> i t— N<c
H U H E
-j <ri 
? ___
O  ~  O  p  s>
2 S <0 ‘o *o G) Vi <o S <o ^ S-j:
O «kj o |o o o
T O  2 3i 2
4  CC-
^ 'g £: cQ o 0  __
o O o  <3 a  3  ^
CO CO CO 00 co GO °0
-  8 1
0 Q  ^ r \ O
6 Q Q
o O 0 o 0 - ^ 4
^  2  *  5: %  *  <
*| 1 ot <Q 




in w lu >
SO J'" ^  &  
W) fO rq 'O
CO 00 GO 0Q
0 — 64
N-) 1 rO tO 
CQ CQ
cn Cr~ o — mi
^ ^  <0 ‘0 ^ * 0  
CQ CQ CQ 00 <X) ̂ 0
- <92 -
Si
^ <* 2 ? v3
n ' t
0 £ 4j a*
o S ®  -0 ° «
v, 0
!S* o
i j l ?
A ^ S  ^ -> 1
v-'»l*<u. 5^ v
« S Si o -|
* «< o,-J





o .£ ° 'f "'a  Q Qi IIU iE <
O <T.o -coir 
A  Q  v
uj A? Q<tX u * to
a  Q K I d  * tf a
<S At
<3 OQ  O
1 | y | i | i | ^ | ^ >  M i  ( M M  i|i| ,|i|ij
2* u y1 n 1/1 r, ^ ' / , W u , - > c o u , ln w ‘p
-. -j
* IO S'
- j ^  
*£sfcfc v> ̂5. 2 • ? ̂o £ " o^ ■"<1*513otpl ro'i 7




o  — . c-< -~r *o soA  A  A  A  £  a
oo 00 oo co ao co oo co





%  V ?  V*C C o (I
£ . v  w  
u )  m
S T
Q a ' JQ  Q
VtlS *S«r *V-CotO W Ui
Q Q t





o q  i«
•j> i  ? O 11 0 m * *>
If o  UJ
H tUik 5r r<i • <  '■ 
.■^ UlfcrfC <T 
* U  >>u_ 6f
o
Cl £<*Jut
U j  ti.
s i i i  i ? i iiin
§ 0
Q Q CO m
U O <Teg- u;
III
O  — 54 









In 1927, "the Committee of The Journal of the Royal 
Technical College, accepted for publication an account of 
part of the work. A copy of the reprint is herewith presented, 
together with a mathematical investigation given by way of 
extension to this paper. The author acknowledges his 
indebtedness to Professor James Muir, M.A., D.Sc., A.R.T.C., 
and Mr. Alex. D. Third, B.Sc., Ph.D., A.R.T.C., for assistance 
given in the mathematical investigation.
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The drop in Temperature produced by the 
passage of Hot Gases through apertures.
The following rough calculations are given by way of 
extension to the paragraph at the foot of page 119 of the 4th.
Number of the Journal of the Royal Technical College (Paper on 
Preventing Electrical Apparatus from starting Explosions).
The paragraph is as follows:- “The cooling of hot gases, 
by passing through a gap, may be regarded as being effected in two 
ways (i) naturally by the sudden expansion from high pressure to 
low, and (ii) by passing over the cold surfaces of the metal flanges. 
The heat absorbed by a cold metal surface from a hot gas passing 
over it, is proportional to the area of the surface, to the density
of the gas, to the speed with which the gas sweeps over the surface
and to the difference in temperature between the surface and the hot 
gas. When a 'gap' is short, deep and of small area the first cause 
of cooling probably predominates; with long narrow gaps cooling is 
possibly accomplished mainly by the large metal surface swept over."
In considering the passage of hot gases (such as steam)
through nozzles, it is found that the passage of the gas may be 
regarded as being a "reversible adiabatic expansion". This may be 
a large assumption if applied to the passage of flames from an 
explosion but it will be made (combustion is not adiabatic). For 
the reversible adiabatic expansion of ideal gas, p v n 3 Constant 
and p v * RT, hence if the expansion^through the gap be from 
Px , Tx , to P2, Tg, T2 = Tx (!^j n . Taking n (the ratio of
the specific heats of the gas at constant pressure and constant 
volume) as 1 .4  and r s ?2/Pi, then Tg « Tx r 0 ,2 8 6 . if the gap 
is a convergent or a parallel one the outlet pressure is always 
O .5 3 of the initial pressure (if the final pressure is not above 




Should, the velocity of the stream at any point in the 
gap he required it is given by the equation,
- =
where P-̂  is in lbs/sq. ft.
the specific volume in cub.ft/Lb. 
r the pressure ratio at the point (referred to P-̂ ) 
g the acceleration due to gravity, 
or the flow is given by  /
*  - V / ^ i  £  - “ * >
where w is the flow in lb. per sec. 
and ‘a 1 is the area to flow in sq. ft.
CASE I. 1 "The extreme case of the gap x x 1"
The form of the passage is of the same order as in nozzle 
work, the heat transference through the limited surface of metal is 
negligible when the quantity of gas flowing is considered; the 
expansion being regarded as adiabatic we have 
TP = Tn a?0*286
3 0.53 so T2 - 0.83T1
If say T-̂  r 2000°F (absolute)
Tg a l660°F a drop of 340°F 
but for this case Fig. 5 P I22 
the Journal paper gives a maximum 
Pressure P1 = 57 lb/in.2 (abs).
So P2 = 0.53 x 57 = 30 lbs/in2 
Pj = 15 lbs/in2 (atmospheric.)
There is thus expansion from 30 lbs to 15 lbs/in2 
after leaving the gap. This expansion takes place very close 
to the gap and produces further cooling which is probably of 
importance.
Abt.
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CASE II. Another extreme case - the gap 0.03" x 29" x 1"
Pig* 5> p.122 gives P-ĵ = 21 lb/in2 absol. 
Pp = P_ a 15 lb/in2 3 (atmos).2 - -3
Cooling due to adiabat|c expansion, 




If Tx 2 2000°F (absol) Tg = l800°F 
A drop of 200°F.
21 IV
Now consider the heat lost by transmission to the cold metal
sides of the gap.
Reynolds' laws of heat transmission, stated in the
paragraph quoted at the beginning of this note may be expressed
by the equation.
H - B / °  vtffi [h s  A f B /° v t m  - the term A for gases
L at rest being negligible.JJ
where t m i s  the mean temperature difference between hot gas and
metal; v is the speed of gas, p  the density, B a constant.
H is the heat transmitted per unit area per second.
If w r total weight of gas passing per second and
a 2 cross-section area of flow, w - a v/° and
H = ̂  B t m  (Heat transmitted per sq. foot per sec.)cl
For ordinary transmission through boiler tubes B ~  x'g'oo to Siv,e 
B in B.T.U. per sq. ft. per sec., w being in lbs/sec, a in sq. ft., 
t m in °F.
Now T-̂  and Tg being the temperatures of gas on entering 
and on leaving respectively, then (ignoring natural drop due to 
expansion) we have
Heat taken from gas 2 w.S.(Ti - T2) where S is the spec, 
heat of the gas (pressure constant).
So wr.S.(Tx - Tg) s |  B A t m
Ti - Tg = B.A.t m “TTaT"
where A 2 surface area of 
metal which is 
independent of 




Substituting numbers and taking 8 = 0.24 and the temperature of 
the hot gases somewhere over l800°F (absol.) and temperature of 
metal over 500°F (abs.) so that tm = 1300°F, we get (A and a,both 
being put in sq. inches.)
T1 - T2 = 1gQO-V . T 4 -/-03'^ -a-9 -  300°r
The total drop in temperature might thus be about 500°F, - 200° due 
to natural cooling (expansion) and 300° due to transmission to the 
metal.
Of course the various assumptions made render the 
calculations of very doubtful value. The experiments might lead 
one to expect that the drop of 340°^ got in Case I should be more 
nearly equal to the 500°F got in Case II (both gaps were flame­
proof), but the further cooling in Case I just after the gas leaves 
the gap could reasonably be taken to account for this difference,
without having regard to a possible difference in the internal
s i
temperatures (in one case pressure attained 3T lbs., in the other 
21 lbs/in2 abs.) But 500° seems too small a drop in temperature.
If so, then it can only be suggested that calculations based on 
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